EU blacklist labelled absurd

Article published on October 2013 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Following the publication of the latest update to the EU blacklist of foreign carriers in July of this year, which removed Philippine Airlines and Venezuelan carrier Conviasa from the list, Tony Tyler, the Director General of IATA, spoke out again about the lack of transparency in the decision-making process followed by the EU in adding and removing airlines or whole countries to or from the EU blacklist.

In June 2013, Tony Tyler called the EU’s list of banned airlines “absurd” when speaking at the IATA Annual General Meeting in Cape Town, South Africa. Of the 20 countries currently subject to a blanket ban on the EU blacklist, 15 of them are African, and Tyler has warned that the EU’s disproportionate focus on Africa has led many observers to conclude that its blacklist is a mercantile policy masquerading as a safety policy. He says “the point that all the African airlines make – and that we certainly agree with – is that if a government isn’t exercising sufficient regulatory oversight on aviation, then that applies equally to air navigation service, ground services and everything else. So if it’s not safe for the African carrier to operate into Europe, then why is it safe for the European carrier to operate to the African country?”

The EU’s disproportionate focus on Africa has led many observers to conclude that its blacklist is a mercantile policy masquerading as
a safety policy.

IATA takes a different approach, it says, to that taken by the European Commission, by working with countries to put in place IATA operational safety audits (IOSAs), and engage with countries and carriers on the implementation of IOSA training programmes, as opposed to penalising under-performing airlines. In calling for greater transparency, Tyler said “There are no clear guidelines on what you have to do to get off the banned list...or, indeed how exactly you got on it. In America, the FAA says you’re Category 2, then it identifies what
particular tests you have failed, or what you’re not doing properly, but in Europe there is no checklist. There are no specifications about what standards they want.”

In a thinly veiled reference to the EU’s unilateral imposition of its own emissions trading scheme on foreign carriers, Tyler said:

“ICAO does its own inspections of the regulatory authorities and helps them lift their game where necessary. But Europe is going off on its own again, as it seems to love doing in this industry.”

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Holding pattern for EU Airports Package

Article published on October 2013 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

The progress of the European Commission’s EU Airports Package, which was published in December 2011 to address issues on slots, ground-handling, and noise, has stalled. The European Parliament has approved all three elements of the package of legislation, with some substantive amendments, at First Reading stage, but the European Council has not.

Slots

The slots proposal was amended and approved at first reading by the European Parliament on 12 December 2012. The Parliament made some changes to the Commission’s original proposal, maintaining the current ratio of the use it or lose it rule at 80:20, and reduced the Commission’s proposal for the qualifying length for a series of slots from 15 to 5 in Summer and 10 to 5 in Winter. The amendments are now with the European Council for consideration. The rumours coming out of Brussels are that the text of the proposed new Slot Regulation is
not agreed and that it is becoming increasingly uncertain whether a new Slot Regulation will be required at all.

One ongoing concern for airlines is that the European Commission and Parliament are resentful that airlines have control of their own slots, and that they (the EU legislature) may reserve the right to tackle the issue of who should own slots at a later date. This issue is of particular concern because airlines have capitalised the value of their slots as assets in their balance sheets, so any indication of an attempt by EU legislators to introduce measures to change slot ownership has to be monitored carefully.

Ground-handling

The proposed increase in the minimum number of ground handling companies given licences to operate at large airports is politically very sensitive, with the German ground-handlers’ unions, particularly at Frankfurt and Munich airports, exerting considerable lobbying pressure on MEPs.

The European Commission proposed an increase in groundhandlers at large airports from 2 to 3 at airports with more than 5 million passengers per annum. The Rapporteur for the TRAN Committee of the European Parliament, Polish MEP, Arthur Zasada, proposed in his working report to the TRAN Committee an increase in groundhandlers from 2 to 4 at qualifying airports. The TRAN Committee rejected this proposal, requiring the Rapporteur to significantly amend his report and find a compromise with the demands of the Employment Committee of the European Parliament. The text that was adopted by the TRAN Committee in March 2013 proposed a smaller increase in groundhandlers from 2-3 only at airports with over 15 million passengers per annum over a 10 year period. The TRAN Committee also proposed more stringent social terms and conditions and protection of employment conditions. These revised recommendations have been narrowly voted through the first reading of the European Parliament, but have not been voted on yet by the European Council – where there are reported to be significant differences of opinion. The timeline for the European Council to vote on this proposed new Regulation is unclear.

Noise

The proposed new noise Regulation is far less controversial than the proposed groundhandling Regulation. The European Parliament agreed on amendments on 12 December 2012 but approval by Council is still pending.

The current EU Lithuanian Presidency did not include the Airports Package in the European Council work plan for its six month Presidency of the EU, which expires in December 2013, which is why progress on the Airports Package has stalled at Council level. The EU Transport Commissioner, Vice President Siim Kallas, wants to have the Airports Package adopted in full, and there has been no move by the European Commission to disaggregate the three component parts of the Package, so the three draft Regulations in their current state look set to stagnate until the Greek Presidency takes over in January 2014.

The Greek Presidency has not yet said whether it is going to prioritise the Airports Package, but if it does, it will face political difficulties in pushing the proposed new groundhandling regulations through. It seems likely that it will not prioritise this package of regulations until after the European Parliament elections have taken place in May next year.

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Merger creates the world’s largest airline

Article published on October 2013 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

The filing of an anti-trust suit by the US Department of Justice back in August to block the merger of American Airlines and US Airways on grounds that it would eliminate competition, reduce route choices, and raise prices, looked as though it would, at worst, completely derail the merger or, at best, delay the process by several months.

The DoJ’s blocking move seemed to represent a seismic shift in its attitude to consolidation in the US airline industry, which it has generally approved in recent years. It was also in stark contrast to the more relaxed stance of the European Commission, which approved the merger in double-quick time, albeit with minor conditions.

US Airways and AMR Corporation, AA’s parent company, that has been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since November 2011, responded aggressively to the DoJ’s announcement, saying it would mount a “strong and vigorous defence” of its plans for the US$11 billion merger. Both US Airways and AA pointed to the advantages of the wave of consolidation over recent years in the US airline industry that has cut the number of large carriers in the US market from eight down to five, and how the reduction in cut-throat competition had enabled the consolidated airlines to operate more profitably and improve services for consumers.

In explaining its position, the DoJ maintained that it had learned important lessons from the 2008 merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines, and the 2010 merger between United and Continental, and were not convinced that the AA – US Airways merger would improve the lot of consumers further. Assistant Attorney General, Bill Baer, said that both US Airways and AA were in a position to be “competitive, aggressive and successful on their own, and that passengers would suffer if the merger was allowed to proceed”. The DoJ focused on how the merger would affect travellers from Washington’s Reagan National Airport, from which the merged airlines would have controlled 63% of nonstop flights, and on the fact that four US airlines would control over 80% of all US commercial flights.

Baer observed “If this merger goes forward, even a small increase in the price of airline tickets, checked bags or flight change fees would result in hundreds of millions of dollars of harm to American consumers.” He did not, however, rule out alternative ideas to a straightforward merger block, in order to preserve competition.

Faced with the prospect of unpicking what would be a very complex merger, which US Airways and AMR Corporation had been planning for over a year, and a costly and time-consuming anti-trust trial scheduled to start on 25 November, settlement negotiations were initiated to try and break the legal deadlock, and the parties agreed to consult a court appointed mediator.

On 12 November 2013, AMR and US Airways announced that they had settled the litigation with the Department of Justice, challenging the merger. Under the terms of the settlement the airlines will divest 52 pairs of slots at Washington Reagan National Airport and 17 pairs of slots at New York LaGuardia Airport, as well as certain gates and related facilities to support services at those airports. The airlines will also divest two gates and related support facilities at Boston Logan International Airport, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International and Miami International airports. The divestitures will take place through a DoJ approval process following the
completion of the merger. As part of the settlement agreement with the Department of Justice, the newly merged airline group has agreed to maintain its hubs in Charlotte, New York (JFK), Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago O’Hare, Philadelphia and Phoenix, in line with its historical operations, for a period of three years. In spite of the enforced divestitures, the new American Airlines Group Inc., as the combined airline will be called, is still expected to generate more than US$1 billion in annual net synergies from the merger, beginning in 2015.

Commenting on the settlement of the litigation and the approval of the merger, Bill Baer said that the airlines’ agreement to divest slots at key airports will allow low-cost carriers to expand and “will disrupt today’s cosy relationships among the incumbent legacy carriers and provide consumers with more choices and more competitive airlines”.

This agreement has the potential to shift the landscape of the airline industry

The settlement was approved by the US Bankruptcy Court on 27 November 2013, and Judge Sean Lane advised that the merger should be completed “without delay”. American Airlines and US Airways were planning to close their merger by 9 December 2013.

The US Attorney General, Eric Holder, commenting on the approved merger said:

“This agreement has the potential to shift the landscape of the airline industry. By guaranteeing a bigger foothold for low-cost carriers at key US airports, this settlement ensures airline passengers will see more competition on nonstop and connecting routes throughout the country.”

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Technology to counter future volcanic ash crisis

Article published on October 2013 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Between 15 April and 21 April 2010, Europe experienced an unprecedented closure of its airspace, with over 100,000 flights cancelled, and an estimated 10 million passengers affected over a period of seven days. Airlines based in Northern Europe had all of their aircraft grounded as a result of airport closures, and overall, the European airline industry had 75% of its operations closed at the peak of the ash plume. It was catastrophic.

Three days into the crisis, as European airspace remained closed, several of the major carriers protested that national civil aviation authorities and Eurocontrol were acting too cautiously in maintaining the flight ban. Several airlines conducted their own test flights in the last two days of the crisis, including Air France-KLM and Lufthansa, and found the atmosphere to be clear.

Since the volcanic ash crisis, Airbus and Nicarnica Aviation have been developing technology for the fitting of sensors to aircraft for the detection and the measurement of the density of ash clouds, so that pilots can avoid them.

In an extraordinary experiment conducted on 13 November 2013, a tonne of volcanic ash, collected and dried from the 2010 Eyjafjallajokul eruption by the Institute of Earth Sciences in Iceland, was flown to Toulouse, then carried in an A400M Airbus aircraft and released at between 9,000-11,000 feet over the Bay of Biscay, to simulate conditions consistent with the volcanic ash cloud in 2010. easyJet then flew an Airbus A340-300 fitted with Airborne Volcanic Object Identifier and Detector (AVOID) sensors developed by Nicarnica Aviation towards the ash cloud, and successfully identified the ash from distances of 60 km, as well as accurately measuring its concentration. The tonne of volcanic ash released was apparently measured at 2.8km in diameter and was visible to the naked eye, but quickly dissipated, becoming difficult to identify.

Aircraft fitted with AVOID sensors would be able to feed back information to the ground in any future volcanic ash eruption, giving real time data to enable an accurate picture of the location and size of ash clouds to be built up, as well as their density, which would inform decisions on the ground as to whether airspace needs to be closed.

easyJet is planning to fit several of its aircraft with AVOID sensors by the end of 2014, so that if, and when, the Icelandic volcanoes erupt again, they will be able to argue coherently with national civil aviation authorities in the EU that it is not necessary to impose a blanket no-flight ban and shut down large areas of European airspace.

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Supply Chain Global Governance

Article published in The Economist Management Blog | September 16, 2013 and reproduced by courtesy of Parag Khanna

Could corporations replace national governments?

Five years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the post-financial crisis world has played out quite differently from the dominant narrative of the immediate aftermath. Then it was predicted that globalization could rapidly unravel, export-led emerging markets would slump, and the private sector would be massively re-regulated. Instead, cross-border trade and investment have exceeded 2007 levels, emerging market growth has been robust, and corporations have proven quite nimble in limiting overly onerous regulation.

Still, the world economy is fragile and expectations are high—from governments, the public (“the 99%”), and a growing chorus of shareholders—that companies play a role commensurate with their resources and influence to advance agendas ranging from environmental sustainability to reducing income inequality. The debate has moved beyond clichés about “the market” being necessary to solve all problems towards a more sophisticated approach that I call “supply chain global governance.” This combines the “do no harm” mantras around limiting operational externalities with a proactive strategy to leverage supply chains wherever possible to improve standards and quality of life. I believe that this regime-based approach is likely to replace “corporate social responsibility” in the coming years.

Some of the world’s largest firms have taken notable steps in the direction of progressive supply chain governance. Walmart, the world’s largest retailer, has partnered with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to reduce emissions across its vast footprint of warehouses, distribution centers, and outlets. In May this year it blacklisted almost 250 Bangladeshi factories after the tragic building collapse in Dhaka, sending ripples throughout the garment industry. Apple has worked with the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to identify dozens of improvements in worker safety and other areas now being implemented in Foxconn factories in China. DHL works closely with customs officials in dozens of countries to smooth customs processing, bringing efficiency gains that alone can boost global GDP by 5 percent according to a recent study by Bain Capital.

While examples from the Fortune 100 are numerous, within those same ranks many questions remain such as how this approach differs across public and private firms, and how it will (or will not) scale across state-owned enterprises and SMEs—particularly from the developing world. Some emerging market companies like Petrobras and Vale, both of Brazil, have established solid track records in the sustainability arena, but more opaque Chinese SOEs are far further behind the curve.

Then there is the deeper challenge of the incredible complexity of supply chains themselves. The European horsemeat scandal, the tainted New Zealand baby formula in China, and the BP Deep Water Horizon oilrig in the Gulf of Mexico are just several of the major supply chain crises in recent memory. These complex meta-national structures therefore require far more scrutiny and analysis even as we come to rely on them as tools of delivering public goods.

Still, corporations and their supply chains are already critical players in global governance. The highest body in commercial arbitration, for example, is the privately run International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) based in Paris, which simultaneously helps craft collective business positions on international policy issues such as WTO trade negotiations. A nascent effort has begun to apply international humanitarian laws to business actors. The UN Voluntary Principles seek to regulate the activities of corporations operating in zones of conflict. While on the surface this appears to be an example of states strengthening their leverage over corporations, it should instead be viewed as a mutually beneficial process: firms are intimately involved in crafting the regulations, for which the UN is a repository, but its ultimate effectiveness ultimately hinges on the participating companies themselves.

Over the past several years I’ve been involved in the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 process that earlier this year published a major report titled “Alternative Worlds.” It includes a very plausible scenario titled “Non-State World” in which urbanization, technological advance, and capital accumulation accelerate the rise of private players that bend rules to maximize their productive power, particularly through the creation of special economic zones within and across national borders. As the scenario describes this trend, “It is as if the central government acknowledges its own inability to forge reforms and then subcontracts out responsibility to a second party. In these enclaves, the very laws, including taxation, are set by somebody from the outside. Many believe that outside parties have a better chance of getting the economies in these designated areas up and going, eventually setting an example for the rest of the country.”

My only quibble with this fine analysis is that it describes the world of 2013, not 2030. Supply chains, like globalization itself, are a complex system that is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. They are already integral to global governance. Corporate leaders must get accustomed to being CEOs, diplomats and statesmen at the same time.

Author: Parag Khanna / Publisher: SCMO

The Independent Republic of the Supply Chain

Published by Quartz on March 19, 2013 and reproduced by courtesy of Parag Khanna

Each week brings new revelations in the scale of the European horse meat scandal and yesterday came news of faulty, too-sheer yoga pants, but there is a common theme: the complexity of untangling the supply chains of producers, distributors and vendors spanning a dozen countries. From Romanian abattoirs to IKEA in the Czech Republic to frozen lasagna meals in Britain’s Tesco grocery stores, the process of tracing the origins of the horse meat, conducting food safety tests, and enforcing standards has overwhelmed regulators, laboratories, consumers, and food vendors. When HSBC’s airport jet-way campaign featured a panel that read, “In the future, the food chain and supply chain will merge,” this is surely not what it had in mind.

The horse meat scandal pertains to one sector, food, and one geography, Europe. But the supply chains of energy, finance, electronics, and much else have driven the matrices of business to envelop the world. Ever more, not less, multinationals depend on foreign markets for parts and profits. In many sectors, supply chains have become nearly impossible to untangle, even within just one or two countries. Whether BP, Transocean or Halliburton is responsible for the sinking of the Deep Water Horizon oilrig and massive subsequent Gulf oil spill in 2010 is still being arbitrated. Every day brings new headlines about supply chain confusion, exploited loopholes, and messes to clean up: in late February a Taiwanese company making Apple iPhone casings at a plant outside Shanghai was accused of polluting a local river.

Supply chains—the systems and networks of producers of goods and services that transform raw materials and components into products delivered to customers—are now an autonomous force in the world. Like globalization itself, they are greater than any one nation or economy. Some are entirely private, while others are hybrids of public and corporate actors. Many now connect Western and emerging market firms into a sprawling nexus that lacks a single headquarters and thus obeys no one jurisdiction. Supply chains have widened and deepened to such an extent that we must now ask ourselves: do we control the supply chains, or do the supply chains control us?

The new empire

With their cash reserves and legal protections, corporations act with greater agility than governments or households, who face greater constraints on their movements. In the 1980s, before “political economy” became a vogue graduate school major, the legendary London School of Economics professor Susan Strange coined the term “triangular diplomacy” to describe how multinational corporations (MNCs) have become so powerful that they engage on equal footing with governments, that are often mere “supplicants” to firms as they seek the capital, technology, and knowledge they cannot themselves generate. China’s rise is largely owed to its integration into global manufacturing supply chains, while India’s economy would not grow at all without liberalizing in ways that favor the expansion of private commercial supply chains.

Supply chains have effectively become their own form of governance, varying widely in nature depending on geography and sector, and with differing degrees of involvement by states, but undoubtedly transnational units of authority in their own right. The supply chain’s ambition is not territorial aggrandizement, but access to markets. They seek to oversee the greatest share of the flow of goods, capital and innovations. Expanding and improving supply chains is more important that boosting trade for the future of global growth. According to a new study by Bain Capital, if countries reduced border administration delays and improved telecom and transport infrastructure to just half the global standard, global GDP would rise by 5%. For supply chains, the extended market is the empire.

The paradox of the growing power of corporations is that even as their autonomy grows, their role as co-governors (or suppliers of governance) does as well. More than ever before, corporate supply chains shape and even create government regulation where they are lacking and provide public goods governments don’t. European hydropower companies write the legislation to govern their own industry in Nepal, since no such laws exist; private hospital chains in India enter poor backwaters and provide basic medical services where the government never has, as do private or philanthropic schools spreading literacy. As states come to depend more on corporations, the distinction between public and private, customer and citizen, melts away. Nowhere is this more true than a country like Nigeria, whose budget depends so existentially on Shell’s oil extraction, yet whose population expects public services to come from Shell as much as from its own government. In Nigeria, it is never clear who is in charge or who is exploiting whom.

Our dependence on many supply chains is nearly absolute. DHL can get any item anywhere in the world faster than anyone—even than the US military, one of its biggest clients, who uses it to transport everything from mobile battle stations to Halloween candy. When China suddenly banned the export of rare earth minerals in 2010, politically oblivious disk drive manufacturers woke up to their reliance on Chinese suppliers of these precious but essential components. The tsunami/earthquake that devastated Japan in early 2011 forced Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers to scramble to new suppliers. With lagging Indian investment in the extractive sector, its diminished iron ore production has led to a spike of greater than $40 in the key ingredient for steel-making, swelling profits for BHP, Vale, and other mining giants. Commanding supply chains, not geography per se, is how winners and losers are determined today.

The tug-of-war between public and private power is far from settled. Indeed, it is just one symptom of far deeper shifts in global order that is still in the early phases of unfolding. With this complexity comes the need to re-assess, even supersede, some of the bedrock concepts of modern international relations, particularly the primacy of state sovereignty and territoriality. Instead, we need to appreciate how non-state actors are building global authority on the basis of wealth and resources, how loyalty can be horizontal to communities beyond vertical states, and how a wide range of players operate with increasing autonomy to pursue the own interests. Governance, both local and global, are open to all, and governments have to prove their utility to matter.

The global mobility of money

There is an adage that “who has the money makes the rules.” Sovereign wealth funds, currency traders, hedge funds, dark pools, institutional investors, asset managers, private equity firms, bond holders, and debt vultures are major independent players in driving, shaping, and pushing the world’s $225 trillion of global financial stock. The countless public and private players in the financial world compete for profits, ride each other’s waves, and discipline each other at the same time. Hedge fund managers spotted the weakness in the US housing market while Fannie, Freddie and mortgage lenders advanced the sub-prime mortgage policy. Hedge funds face less regulatory oversight than public companies, and are thus attractive to the wealthy. As the Economist recently reported, the re-privatization of public companies has restored financial control over to private hands. The total market value of privatized firms grew from less than $50 billion in 1983 to almost $2.5 trillion in 2009—roughly 10% of the world’s aggregate market capitalization, and 21% of the non-US total—and overall private capital assets are estimated at $21 trillion.

Globalization has dramatically enhanced the financial autonomy of even the world’s largest and seemingly most rooted multinational corporations. Whereas it was once an article of faith, as articulated in the 1950s by GM president Charles Wilson, that “What is good for the US is good for GM and vice-versa,” today it is far less clear. American multinationals increasingly enjoy the rule of law, investor protection, and innovative environment of the US, but derive over half their revenues from emerging markets. This applies across the spectrum from Hollywood films to automobile and pharmaceutical sales. As a result, MNCs can grow even during downturns at home while growth continues abroad. But globally distributed enterprises such as Apple, GE, IBM also hold massive assets offshore where tax rates are lower or nil – and sometimes relocate headquarters altogether as Halliburton did in moving to Dubai.

For nations, geography is fixed. For firms, it is an arbitrage opportunity. The Financial Times reported that Starbucks, Google, Amazon and other mega-companies pay less in tax to the UK than their share of revenue from it by using offshore holding companies from Belgium to Bermuda. An important component of a firm’s resiliency today is its capacity for regulatory arbitrage, the capacity to be geographically agile in mastering jurisdictions and regulations.

Of the 100 largest economic entities in the world, approximately half are companies, even excluding state-owned companies. Wal-mart has a market capitalization greater than all but the G-20 economies. Its annual revenues are greater than $446 billion (2012). In 2006, it alone was responsible for 12% of China’s exports. It is also the world’s largest private employer with a workforce of over 2 million people. Apple’s $600 billion market cap is larger than the GDP of over 120 countries. Its cash on hand is sufficient to bail out several ailing euro zone economies. In South Korea, Apple’s rival Samsung accounts for 8% of the national tax revenue.

Exxon Mobil, the largest energy company with a market cap of about $400 billion, represent how private energy companies like Shell and Chevron deliver stable global supply to the market while also providing local populations with employment and welfare—outlasting dozens of failed governments in the process. As Steve Coll points out in his recent book Private Empire, Exxon is the largest taxpayer in Chad, while Shell accounts for more than 21% of Nigeria’s total petroleum production of 629,000 barrels per day in 2009. In Iraq, Exxon’s direct dealings with the provincial government of Kurdistan could very well trigger an Arab-Kurd civil war that will force the country’s disintegration.

There is no doubt that the surge in state-owned enterprises in banking, energy, and other sectors represents a countervailing trend, especially given its prominence in crucial states such as China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. But it is also a trend that has reached its high-water mark for significant reasons. One is the suspicion of hostile state intent and subsequent blockage of cross-border state-owned enterprise (SOE) activity. Recent examples range from Dubai Ports World in 2006 to Huawei in 2011, and Australia’s blocking the merger with Singapore’s stock exchange. Another is the quality of corporate governance, whereby SOEs are often inefficient and slower to respond to changing market conditions. They also tend to lack the technological sophistication of private players. Because SOEs are bound to national governments, they cannot relocate when domestic circumstances worsen. Only private firms have agility when nationality becomes a liability.

We should be grateful for this trend. As Paul Midler documented in his supply chain tell-all Poorly Made in China, China’s SOEs face no market accountability; their only aim is to cut costs, often at the expense of standards. Witness the melamine contaminated pet food and baby milk scandals, and Mattel recall of baby bear toys whose eyes could fall out and choke children. The trust networks of factory managers and workers never extend past the next link in the supply chain, let alone to the broader Chinese or global consumer population. It was 6,000 Chinese babies poisoned by the melamine formula, not foreigners.

Western firms too want to cut costs; that is, after all, what drives outsourcing in the first place. But they face consumer pressure points that can have impact where government regulation falls short. Consumer activist and NGO expert groups have been crucial to certifying supply chains for diamonds and timber, and labeling dolphin catch-free tuna and GMO-free organic produce.

Auret van Heerden, head of the Fair Labor Association (FLA), gave a prominent TED talk in 2010 in which he used the phrase “Independent Republic of the Supply Chain.” He provided striking examples of how the outsourcing of outsourcing to suppliers for the production of mobile phones and pharmaceutical has led to large-scale human rights violations, drug contamination, and deaths from Congo to Bangladesh to China. But van Heerden is not an anti-corporate activist. The FLA has over 4,000 corporate members who work with NGOs, regulators, and other bodies to make supply chains safer and cleaner. It has pressured Apple, for example, to improve working conditions at FoxConn factories while Chinese authorities preferred efficiency at the lowest price.

Accountability means knowing where the buck stops—something that is increasingly complicated in a supply-chain driven world. Governments can’t fully control what they do not own. They need supply chains to carry out their own functions, and they need to partner with corporations and NGOs if they want to protect and serve their citizens. A franchise business can be more accountable due to strict rules set forth by a powerful parent company. McDonald’s has more capacity to inspect itself, and more incentive to do so to protect its brand, than any government can devote to monitoring efforts. All consumers worldwide are simultaneously citizens of the Independent Republic of the Supply Chain.

Diplomatic agency and responsibility

As multinational firms acquire wealth and market access through overseas expansion, their economic footprint and diplomatic reach becomes larger than many countries’ diplomatic services. The world’s largest democracy and a rising power such as India has fewer than 1,000 foreign service professionals, less than the number of lobbyists employed by a handful of multinationals in Washington and Brussels alone. Some African countries have foreign services that number only several hundred at the largest, many of whose primary task is to woo investment from such companies.

The Arab Spring has revealed a far deeper challenge than the corruption of Arab regimes. It is in fact just a symptom of the much broader entropy gripping much of the post-colonial world, from Africa through the Near East to South Asia. Dozens of states have squandered the last half-decade since independence. Cold War alliance politics takes some of the blame, but across these regions a succession of corrupt regimes have presided over populations that have tripled and sometimes quadrupled in size without building or refurbishing the requisite infrastructure, whether power lines, railways, housing, hospitals or schools. These conditions of general neglect have given rise to the reality of corporations serving as de facto “public” service providers.

Particularly in Latin America and Africa, supply chains serve as governance due to the absence of meaningful government. In Congo’s “copper belt” of Katanga, mining enclaves have become a new kind of post-colony that scarcely belongs to a country that barely exists. Mining companies in the Andean region educate and train their local managers who would otherwise be illiterate; oil companies in Guinea-Bissau fund AIDS treatment; and bottling companies provide housing for workers in Indonesia. There are no doubt many abuses of power, even crimes such as Chiquita’s usage of paramilitaries in Colombia to target union activists, but these take place within the context of supply chain service provision as compared to the outright neglect of the state. Even for what seem like the obvious sectors for resource rich countries to invest their scarce capital in, the private sector still does the public’s job. To this day, if you want to scope out a location for a mine in Zambia, you’ll need to lease a private plane from a company like K5 aviation to get to the site, still inaccessible by road. Public airports haven’t been built yet outside major population centers.

The privatization of major infrastructure, from American ports to British airports to the Panama Canal, applies de facto the world’s newest and most pervasive infrastructure: telecoms and the internet. Thirty corporations today control 90% of world internet traffic. Mega-grids that span entire regions connect once “off-grid” territories to world markets faster than any inter-governmental negotiation. Want to hire some techies to program African apps? Better hire them from Google-sponsored computer training centers in Nairobi, rather than public universities.

Even powerful nations face the paradox of being wealthy on paper, but unable to muster the fiscal investment to meet basic needs. Across Russia, the infirmed and elderly volunteer to be guinea pigs for Western pharmaceutical companies’ clinical trials given the precipitous decline in the country’s healthcare system. Even in America, rehabilitating once mighty Detroit has fallen on the shoulders of a troika of corporate moguls such as Dan Gilbert, founder of Quicken Loans, who along with the owner of the Detroit Redwings and CEO of Pensky Tires is funding myriad real estate redevelopment projects and a light-rail for the city’s downtown area.

Whether or not certain governments are in retreat, private-private diplomacy is becoming increasingly important to provide for global public goods. Private actors increasingly network with each other in ways that improve their overall effectiveness. For example, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) now works directly with Wal-Mart along its supply chain to reduce carbon emissions. Neither is waiting for an inter-governmental climate treaty. Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), another NGO, has a staff of over 30 in China who are full-time consultants to Western and Chinese companies on improving labor conditions in factories. In the new supply chain diplomacy, form follows function: whoever can get the job done gets the deal.

Does it all add up?

The convergence of post-war Western economies created the conditions for the rise of the modern transnational corporation, and there is very little that can be done to reverse it. Protectionist policies that would undermine the international presence and standing of one’s own national champions by evoking painful reciprocal measures from other states. Inter-state diplomacy enabled our current phase of globalization and interdependence, but multinationals have become the key driver. Even the strong regulations imposed on Wall Street banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis have severe loopholes, and calls are growing stronger to revise aspects of the Dodd-Frank legislation that have harmed competitiveness.

There is no doubt that inter-state regulations and international law provide both the crucial opportunity as well as the ultimate constraint on the rising global power of private actors. Yet we must be careful not to assume sovereignty as a trump card when it clearly matters only where it is meaningfully enforced. There is also the claim that global firms require the stability and rule-in-law that is only provided by Western nations. But this fails to notice the rise of hundreds of globally competitive multinationals emerging from Brazil, the Arab world, and Asia that meet the criteria of product standards and corporate governance to be listed on stock exchanges worldwide. Furthermore, many global firms increasingly act as international partnerships, diminishing the centrality of any single headquarters, even in the US, in favor of local joint ventures and tailored strategies for each market.

Corporations and their supply chains are already critical players in global governance. The highest body in commercial arbitration, for example, is the privately run International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) based in Paris, which simultaneously helps craft collective business positions on international policy issues such as WTO trade negotiations. A nascent effort has begun to apply international humanitarian laws to business actors. The UN Voluntary Principles seek to regulate the activities of corporations operating in zones of conflict. While on the surface this appears to be an example of states strengthening their leverage over corporations, it should instead be viewed as a mutually beneficial process: firms are intimately involved in crafting the regulations, for which the UN is a repository, but its ultimate effectiveness ultimately hinges on the participating companies themselves.

The newly published Global Trends 2030 report of the National Intelligence Council titled “Alternative Worlds” includes a very plausible scenario titled “Non-State World” in which urbanization, technological advance, and capital accumulation accelerate the rise of private players that bend rules to maximize their productive power, particularly through the creation of special economic zones within and across national borders. As the scenario describes this trend, “It is as if the central government acknowledges its own inability to forge reforms and then subcontracts out responsibility to a second party. In these enclaves, the very laws, including taxation, are set by somebody from the outside. Many believe that outside parties have a better chance of getting the economies in these designated areas up and going, eventually setting an example for the rest of the country.”

America—and its companies—can only strengthen regulation where they participate in supply chains, such as th rough the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which holds sway over American companies and those doing business with American companies. For better or worse, supply chains are the answer to supply chains. Supply chains, like globalization itself, are a complex system that is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The food chain and the supply chain have indeed merged—as has much else.

Author: Parag Khanna and Ahmed El Hady / Publisher: SCMO

Transport Weekly

Published on 15 March 2013 in "I am an Analyst" and reproduced by courtesy of Charles de Trenck

BDI 880 +6%: The BPIY continues at rebound levels of mid-12 and is up about 3% on the week (slope of rebound is slowing), with long term concerns on China coal and ore inventories remaining.  Reference ore prices came off quite a bit this week. Comments going around recently were that China is not going to buy ore at recent peaks. Moreover steel inventories are pretty chunky even if ore levels are down … A question would be the new run rate needed for inventories, which does not have to be at previous averages, and given lower growth trajectory for China…. Keeping a quick track on the dollar index, it is up about 3.6% YTD. Strong dollar is usually negative for shipping/commodities… only that shipping is so down at this point I would not hold this relationship key, except for its general impact to the commodities world… TANKERS behaving better… some are cautioning to keep an eye out for news on Suez Canal and Egypt

Investment stance: Gold shares still getting killed. I have stayed long dollar long US, but most things I have held that are China-related has been weak, ex anti-pollution themes. My health, anti-pollution focus brings me to flagging [XXXX] and how fast (after being ignored since IPO) it has gotten on the map. Macro wise (like GLNG after the Japan earthquake), it makes sense to look for names that can play the theme on China Cleanup. For me it has been Platinum. But I think clean engines… clean-up equipment companies all fit into a China eco-friendly theme that will be around for a very long time

MAIN APPROACH UPDATE

My approach has remained the same throughout – be conservative in a highly volatile sector.  

Shipping, Logistics, Ports for me have always been about staying in tune with the pulse of world trade. On the whole, I don’t pay attention to WTO statements, national GDP data, senior management statements, rate hike announcements, etc. I believe in running real time series and cross-referencing what their inter-relationships are saying.

When is a correlation important? When could it breakdown? What is the raw volume data looking like? What time of the year is it? What’s our visibility like right now? Where is the value? In what currency or value marker terms? I have believed gold has been a more true marker of value and that it has shown US equities in general to be in the cheaper range, while not discounting the need to own some gold long term to defend against central bank fiat currencies gone wild. At the same time I have seen value in holding more dollars than other FX in recent months even if I always believe we should have a diverse holding of currencies and commodities.

My main support from oversold levels in the last few years has been certain areas of the US property market.

When it comes to shares I have stayed away from focusing on individual stocks “in and of themselves” and preferred to recommend making our own ETFs. Even in a weak market for shipping there has been a way to get exposure. I need companies with track records, reasonable managements and reputations, liquidity, market leadership, defensive exposure to liabilities (despite the Fed, Central Banks and commercial banks (up until 2008-09) telling the whole world to gear up on mind-numbingly low interest rates. I believe currently in long term ETF bundles for:

  • Energy/infrastructure: Canada, coal, oil…companies oversold and unloved and generally trading at lower ends of multiples, whether Warren likes them or not…
  • Shipping/Logistics/Traders: Market leaders and from levels that were relatively low long term. There are a few good leaders in Europe in this space. There are a couple in the US, and a few in Asia. For corporate governance/ethical reasons, I try to stay away from some companies with bad names (and abusing common sense such as in Ethanol…)
  • US Consumer/healthcare: Without supporting big pharma overall, I have looked for defensive yield, good management. I have traded around positions in some of the big heavyweights of US retail/discounters
  • Health: For a double dose and core concentration, I am increasing where and when I can clean living focus companies. There are not many listed and they trade at premiums. I have learned that sugar based consumer product and beverage companies are the biggest sells out there. America will have to change!
  • Tech: I see this as consumer, and I have looked for bellwethers on sell-offs     

China Rebar Inventories…

Source: Bloomberg  Note: Shanghai steel inventories higher in recent weeks but way below ‘10. BUT checkout Wuhan at 100% over ‘10 levels!

Source: Bloomberg  
Note: Shanghai steel inventories higher in recent weeks but way below ‘10. BUT checkout Wuhan at 100% over ‘10 levels!

What happens to a stock when it’s got the right theme (note the share volumes out of nowhere)

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

CONTAINERS/PORTS/LOGISTICS

Data for Asia-Europe remains weak, with 2012 at about -4% (always getting revised…)...Hopefully 2013 can be better, but issues such as how weak the Euro is against the dollar and Italian and other crises could have positive or negative impacts.  My view has been that the dollar is in steady rebound mode. If the dollar continues higher this could make Asia a little less competitive if Asia currencies tend to gravitate around dollar strength. On the flipside and to a less impactful degree for the Asia trade, this could help this could eventually help Europe export more.  In the Transpac, although 2012 growth was not negative, the 2% type growth from Asia to the US was lower than 3-5% growth many of us had expected several months back. … Interestingly, US inventories were reported to be higher. LB and LA ports reported better Feb container port data with LA +17.0% and LB +36.6%. CMA is key driver of LB growth.

Asia Outbound Current Pattern (we’ve been relatively flat in big picture for some time now)

 

Source: Charles de TrenckNote: 4Q12 picture not complete/still seeing revisions… 1Q13 needs March data to see proper direction given Chinese New Year interuptions

Source: Charles de Trenck
Note: 4Q12 picture not complete/still seeing revisions… 1Q13 needs March data to see proper direction given Chinese New Year interuptions

Question: How often do we get a jump like this in inventories?
(as we had in US this week…is it cause sales about to jump more? Or will volumes have to slow a little more?)

 

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

APL shelves the 53footers: Launched in November 2007, APL's custom-strengthened 53ft ocean capable containers are to be retired from the carrier's South China to Los Angeles service due to poor returns. “The economics just didn't work,” according to APL Americas' CEO, Gene Seroka.  53ft containers are basic to US domestic transportation. The 53 footers have about 60% more capacity than 40 footers Until APL's launch of the hybrids, standard 53ft containers were not strong enough for ocean voyages.

APM Terminals to operate Turkish terminal:  APMT (Maersk) will build and operate the Aegean Gateway Terminal under a 28-year concession, with a $400m and in a phase I 1.5m TEU facility for mid-15 start. Bulk will also be part of operations. The port lies in the petrochemical complex of Petkim in Nemrut Bay, close to Izmir, the second-largest industrial city in Turkey. The initial 1.5m TEU capacity at the new container terminal is about 50% more than the current city port of Izmir at about 700,000 TEU a year. With a depth alongside of 10 m, Alsancak can handle vessels no larger than 2,500 TEU.

CSCL takes a share in APM (Maersk) Belgium terminal: CSCL is taking 24% in Zeebrugge from APM Terminals. The 2-berth terminal handles about 380,000TEU but capacity is for 1m TEU. SIPG has 25% as well. APM soldfor EUR27.2min 2010 the 25% stake.

SITC 94$m in 2012: I wasn’t too happy about the timing of the IPO, though my level of concern was never at the level of Rongsheng or HPH in terms of lack of compunction from company and bankers on IPO process/timing. Another issue was the positioning of the company’s image. That aside profit seemed to please in 2012.  SITC said revenues rose to $1.2bn in 2012 from $1.1bn the year before and given about +15% in volumes. SITC’s revenues from China fell from $489m in 2011 to $439m in 2012. S Korea revenues more than doubledto $131m. Japan was + 2% to $428m. Japan is known for being a killer trade with SITC being a main culprit. In addition China- Japan relations will hold back growth here. SITC’s capacity for the year 2012 amounted to 1.8m TEU, up from 1.5m in 2011, it said. It also expanded its land-based logistics business, revenue climbing to $739.6m, from $673.6m in 2011.

RCL still in red….Horizon still in red: I neglected to mention RCL of Thailand posted a $62.7m loss for 2012. I notice shares rebounded in last couple of days though…Horizon Lines over in the US (that little carrier we spent some time a few years ago flagging for some excesses from Beltway Bandit types over in Washington DC) also reported its 2012 loss at $46.1 m.

Container bonds: China Shipping Group issued, according to reports, two batches of short-term notes worth about Rmb3.5bn ($562.9m) to fund container manufacturing and shipbuilding. Gee, didn’t CSCL just sell a whole bunch of containers to book some needed disposal gains. My head is spinning. The first tranche of the Rmb2.5bn paper, due in six months, pays an interest rate of 3.85%.  The paper is jointly underwritten by China Development Bank and China Everbright Bank. Rmb700m of the new credit will “replenish the working capital of China Shipping Industry.”

BULK/COMMODITIES

Diana disappoints: Diana reported 4Q12 net income of $5m against $20m for the same period last year. Judging by the share reaction investors were not happy. It certainly has been a tough market out there. Vessel operating expenses were +30% (daily vessel op ex +6.8% to $7,128/day) against operational stats showing utilization in 4Q12 at 96.3% against 4Q11 at 99.2% 30 vessels end-12against 24 vessels end-11. TCEs were $17,681 in 4Q12 against $25,714 4Q11.

Also see http://seekingalpha.com/article/1274661-diana-shipping-s-ceo-discusses-q4-2012-results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single

Speaking of Bulk, and rebounds….It is interesting to see Precious Shipping enjoying a little of a rebound

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

Is gold price fixing investigation next? According to the Guardian and the WSJ, the London financial sector isbracing for another official investigation into alleged price-fixing following reports that a US regulator is considering launching an inquiry into the City's gold and silver markets. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is discussing whether the daily setting of gold and silver prices in London is open to manipulation. The CFTC is examining whether prices are derived sufficiently transparently. The system of setting gold prices in London is unusual and involves a twice-daily teleconference involving five banks – Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and Société Générale – while silver is set by the latter three. The price fixings are then used to determine prices worldwide….

ENVIRONMENT

See comments on Beijing and China pollution front page and China sections….
The cost of compliance – sometimes out of reach: Lloyd’s List makes a good point that new environmental regulations coming into play over coming ears will see owners forced to instal ballast water technologies, and possibly seek to purchase exhaust gas scrubbers and take other fuel efficiency measures… But they may not be able to get the funding to do it! AP Moller Maersk expects rule compliance will cost the shipping industry $20bn a year. ..  Newbuilding loans often come with clauses, or covenants, that dictate vessels must remain fully compliant with all maritime regulations. Owners that struggle with rule compliance, such as the pending ballast water convention, could find banks use this to foreclose on loans rather than provide more capital. …

BNSF to test LNG locomotives: BNSF, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway, is said to be the second-biggest user of diesel in the country, after the US Navy. And now it is working on with the two principal locomotive manufacturers, GE and EMD, under Caterpillar, to develop natural gas engine technology that will be used in a pilot LNG locomotive program. The WSJ ran a big story on BNSF this week. This follows stories back in January raising questions about BNSF monopoly in the Bakkenfields and proposed pipelines debates, in other words the Keystone XL pipeline…

One of Warren’s better investments in recent years
(with some behind the scenes questions on market “influence and pipelines….market dominance issues)

 

Source: Reuters

Source: Reuters

TANKERS/SHIPBUILDING

Scorpio more share sales: Scorpio continues to raise funds from investors with a further 29m shares tranche of its common stock at $8.10 per share, a discount of 35 cents. Shares again reacted well post placement. The move aims to raise $235m to fund its acquisitions war chest, to pay for further acquisitions and provide working capital, as well as for general corporate purposes.

DSME going into Jackups: DSME is aiming to build up jackps, to take share away from Keppel and Sembcorp Marine that have about a 70% market share. … The need to diversify and be flexible is paramount given a lackluster pipeline for ships over coming years.

STX OSV to stay listed…: This has been one of the most unexciting takeovers in recent memory. Shares were at lows and they remain at lows. Meanwhile Fincantieri which failed to get much more than 4.9% shares in OSV to add to its 50.7%, will rename STX OSV as Vard

COSCO….oh COSCO, when will you learn

My mother would have said… “COSCO, you couldn’t organize yourself out of a paper bag if you wanted to…”

Months after saying it had some re-organization ideas planned to avert issues such as the Shanghai Stock Exchange placing trading limits on it due to potentially running into a third year of losses, COSCO Holdings ( H and A shares) this week came up with a plan to sell its 100% COSCO Logistics division back to COSCO Beijing. But Bloomberg later in the week quoted that over $4bn could be raised! The timing would be awful, and one might wonder what the company would look like after selling $4bn in assets!

Planned sale of COSCO Logistics with recurring earnings power $100+m range, with long term upside: …Here we go again. This is the division that was injected into COSCO Pacific (49%) to boost assets before IPO of COSCO Holdings, while also earning extra fees for senior directors. Then the 50% was sold back to COSCO Holdings...and now it may get sold back to Parent.  COSCO had bought the other 51% from its parent in 2007 prior to its Shanghai IPO. …Not only is this is a poor band aid, it is also a look-see into a history of asset shuffling.

Event (WSJ summary) HK— China COSCO Holdings plans to sell its logistic unit to its state-controlled parent, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co., as part of the Chinese shipping giant's efforts to improve its financial results in 2013 and prevent a possible delisting from the Shanghai Stock Exchange.

Initial thoughts (Tuesday): It is not any one transaction, but in the pattern that the full picture of the COSCO Logistics drama can be seen.

Original COSCO Holdings IPO process and valuations… a few long term questions on GROUP as whole here:

  • Asset transfers back and forth
  • COSCO Logistics continuous transfers between divisions
  • Wei Jiafu role
  • Add ship asset timing gaffes – the big ones on the ships at wrong prices
  • Bulk division massive underperformance (and check those fees please)
  • Accountant issues… PWC as accountant for life

COSCO Logistics follow on thoughts (Wednesday)

….COSCO Holdings dropped a fair amount (about -5%) on the back of its nonsensical logistics unit planned sellback (according to everyone else, check market response) to its parent to book an intended disposal gain to avoid (or partly cover losses against…) Shanghai Stock Exchange chastisement, and due to its guidelines on loss making companies, etc.  As the week wore on it became clearer that more asset sales may be needed, potentially up to over $4bn (??), according to Bloomberg.

….CIMC also fell in with COSCO Holdings as a stake sale was mentioned in press as a potential strategy by parent. By Wednesday it was the turn of COSCO Pacific to sell off at about -4% on early morning trade.

As to CIMC – I would not off the bat agree that it should start a new business in ship leasing, as per recent reports, since it has no core competence there. … and especially as it is competing against its partial parent, COSCO, …the other being China Merchants….  But if it is going to get cheap money from China Inc, and for container ships mostly built in China, and aim for economy of scale as it appears to be aiming for. …Perhaps there will be a role for it as ship lessor down the road. It is certainly too early to tell now. But as such I am fascinated to see what happens next on this front. Who knows – maybe COSCO will do a sale-charterback of some selected ships to vehicles such as CIMC – and at some point where CIMC could be more independent of COSCO (and that be a good thing).  Who knows?  As observers we need to see if CIMC becomes a ship lessor of scale, and if it gets the portfolio management thing…
As to COSCO Pacific – there was a 1 day delayed effect and selling started on Wednesday rather than Tuesday for the parent, potentially in response to the messed up strategy of the various parents. Who knows…

I continue to ask for mainstream press to take a proper look at the COSCO Group of companies. Even the easy pieces such as the crazy sale of logistics back to Beijing parent can still not be covered in any great depth. The SCMP put one small paragraph on it on day 1, followed by a Bloomberg story on day 2. The WSJ tried to do a better job. But there is still no understanding of the process and failures of the Logistics division, which was first pre COSCO Holdings IPO injected into COSCO Pacific at 49%, etc (I have explained this process before*) ...This division and stakes in it have been transferred back and forth with investors at times paying money for it. Now it is taken away from investors. For all we know the Beijing parent may sell it back to investors again later in another IPO!

For its own merits and failures, one forwarder had this to say about COSCO Logistics upon hearing of its intended sale back to parent:….

“Cosco Logistics? What is it? Sell what? Over the years Cosco has spawned logistics companies like Kenwa, who "jumped ship" joined CSCL as a slot charter semi NVOCC and changed their name to Rich Shipping. Cosco Air had one if the first A licenses for air freight. But had no sales offices anywhere in the world and went from being one of the only master loaders to being one of the only ones not moving any significant cargo. This is an organization that wasted the good years and ends up without a clue.”

*At first the logistics division was an internet concept back in ’99 – ‘00, running off the back of B2B relationships of the Group’s back end, along with legacy businesses accorded COSCO and other China state companies, legacies such as running off printers trade documents for a fee, as well as other captive China business. Ironically this was foisted onto investors first by Sinotrans Logistics, again at wrong valuations (because China was going to have to phase it out, and this was not properly explained to investors by bankers, while syndicate rules by bankers limited what analysts could say in deal research, for instance…). COSCO Logistics got the tail end of this. As COSCO Logistics grew, and as logistics in China grew by leaps and bounds with COSCO underperforming some of this BUT still growing, COSCO got higher valuations for injecting its stake at first in COSCO Pacific, on its way to playing a shell game for investors managed by investment banking franchises that won the COSCO Holdings mandate from COSCO leaders such as Wei Jiafu. What Weijiafu wanted was a big IPO for COSCO Holdings…one which raised lots of money for a company that had been fattened up – so they injected a COSCO Logistics stake first into COSCO Pacific. … Later on COSCO Pacific would sell its COSCO Logistics 49% stake to COSCO Holdings – and now COSCO Holdings is selling its larger COSCO Logistics stake back to its parent.   … WHAT DID SHAREHOLDERS GET FOR THIS 10 YEAR HISTORY OF COSCO LOGISTICS? ….

As George Clooney said in one of his films on CBS News early days newscaster Edward Murrow….Goodnight and GoodLuck (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCaBCdJWOyM)

Anyone who isn’t confused really doesn’t understand the situation.
— Edward R. Murrow

CHARTS OF THE MONTH … Check out the number of buy ratings here (also look at Sing MRT vs HK MTR)    
SMRT Snapshot of broker ratings

 

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

No love lost for Singapore’s mass transit after it mishaps

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

CHINA NOTES

Pollution in China remains one of my key themes. I believe China’s leadership will be defined by what it does here, given that many local and some senior leaders openly allowed for decades the dumping of inordinate waste and unchecked wasteful production all over China. 10 years ago my main complaint was allowing for economic growth to be above what was necessary while allowing antiquated steel, coal, etc capacity to run alongside newer, cleaner production facilities. The list of mistakes is long. China needs to go into full reverse on this.

A couple of years ago, my friends at Environmental Services (Eisal) flagged China Everbright International as being on the right theme, though others have raised concerns on cash flow which must be examined long term….

Taicang strong growth…: Taicang terminal reported a total container 4.01m TEU throughput in 2012, or +39%. So farYTD Taicang is about +18% for Jan-Feb. Suzhou port has focused on Taicang for several years, now with MTL (51%) and COSCO Pacific (39%) as ownershttp://www.tac-gateway.com/eng/index.jsp

Ningbo Port planning Rmb 1bndomestic bond issue: A three-year bond, underwritten by Bank of China International, is the second tranche of a Rmb2bn quota approved by China’s securities regulator in 2010. Ningbo Portraised the first Rmb1bn in April 2012 at a fixed interest rate of 4.7% per annum. Rates of the new issuance will be decided after bookrunning is complete, Ningbo Port said in an exchange filing. …. SIPG.bonds: SIPG will sell 3bn RMB in one-year bonds, according to a statement on the Shanghai Clearing House’s website on 5 March.

Qingdao Port ore terminal:  Qingdao Group has started the operation of its new 400k ton iron ore terminal at Dongjiakou port, SinoShip and others reported. This is one of the largest iron ore terminals in the world with annual capacity of 40 m tons.  Dongjiakou becomes the first Chinese port that could officially have the technical capacity to receive Valemaxes.

Iron Ore: As of March 8, combined iron ore inventories at 30 major Chinese ports declined by 2.98m tons from a week ago to 66.54mtons, the lowest level since mid-January 2010 according to data from mysteel.com. Iron ore stocks decreased to 77.75 m tons at 34 Chinese ports compared with the previous week,  according to the China Securities Journal…. See the steel inventory charts. This has been expected and is a continuing trend. One reason given is that ore prices are on high side and buying would only come in at lower price points. One additional thought, as seen with US oil inventories a few years ago, is with industry deceleration comes a need to seek normalization around new averages as the old averages get thrown out the window.
 
From Caixin

(http://shanghaiist.com/2013/03/12/infographic_chinas_new_super_ministries.php)

 

Author: Charles de Trenck / Publisher: SCMO

The new Silk Road is made of iron — and stretches from Scotland to Singapore

Article published on September 28, 2012 in Quartz and reproduced by courtesy of Parag Khanna

At some point in the next 200 million years, according to Yale University scientists, the North American and Eurasian tectonic plates will collide at the North Pole. When they are eventually joined by Africa, the singular super-continent will re-emerge, reminiscent of the Pangea that existed hundreds of millions of years ago.

Until that time, however, the vast oceans that separate North America from the western and eastern halves of Eurasia will continue to have a major impact on the evolution of geopolitics. The pace of globalization has altered our perceptions of space and time:
Communications technology inspires many to proclaim the “death of distance.” Yet a contrary narrative is also emerging, one in which America’s distance from Eurasia places it on the wrong side of the world from the “cockpit of history,” a rapidly integrating Eurasian super-continent that is shaping its own future independently of the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. And the technology that is driving this epochal transformation is one of the most traditional: railways.

Earlier this month, China announced plans to invest an additional $140 billion into 25 new rail projects across the country as part of its massive stimulus campaign aimed at creating jobs and modernizing national infrastructure. China lays more than 5,000 miles of new railway track each year domestically (and by 2020 should have more high-speed rail than the rest of the world combined), and is sponsoring the modernization or deployment of new rail lines across Eurasia towards Europe as well, which has long led the world in mass transit with 24 of 27 countries featuring high-speed rail already. By comparison, the U.S. has failed to muster even the modest $50 billion proposed by President Barack Obama for rail projects. The resulting portrait is appears bleak: while America licks its wounds at home, Chinese blood is pumping through Eurasian veins as the more populous and important hemisphere unites into an organic whole.

Compressing geography

“There lies within the breast of every Englishman an inborn love of railways,” wrote Christopher Portway in Corner Seat, one of several chronicles of his intrepid but cursed Cold War period rail adventures across the clash, and the romance, of civilizations that is the world’s largest landmass. For many, rail travel is still stuck in Portway’s era of the Orient Express. Cultural foibles at customs and border clearing frustrations often plague trips south or east of Poland. Portway constantly haggled for transit visas at checkpoints of countries that spontaneously took on anti-Western moods like Syria and Albania. He made colorful use of the Cold War labels of “pink” for Yugoslavia and “red” for Bulgaria to capture their degrees of unfriendliness.

British adventurism and ambition have clearly suffered since the collapse of the Empire. Whereas railways helped the British Empire
penetrate into the heart of Africa and Asia, by the 1990s London newspapers were waging a fierce debate as to whether Britain or France would benefit more from the Eurostar train linking the two former global powers.

Today, rather than Britain steaming out into the world as it did when it led the Industrial Revolution, China is now steaming its way to Britain more quickly than anyone seems to realize. This westward movement is the unfinished business of the Industrial Revolution—and the reversal of its outcome. History can be turned on its head so quickly. Or corrected, depending on your perspective.

Rail is indeed the 19th century’s preferred mode of transport, but is getting major technology upgrades that give it renewed significance in the 21st. First, the export of Europe and Japan’s high-speed rail systems to China is eventually making cross-Eurasian rail travel more than the romantic overland equivalent of a transatlantic cruise. With state-subsidized rail industries and plenty of short-haul business travelers, Europe and China combined have invested more than $200 billion in high-speed rail in 2009 alone; in Italy, even a private conglomerate, NTV, is running high-speed rail traversing the country.

The oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies are planning a high-speed rail along the Persian Gulf. Worldwide, private rail expenditure is expected to reach $500 billion by 2020. China has only 413 airports to America’s 5,200, but has more than 8,000 kms of high-speed rail, and laying thousands more kilometers of track every year. Under the radar, private American rail operators have spent $23 billion on rail upgrades—but all for freight rather than passenger transit.

Second, Eurasian rail is finally entering the Information Age, getting its equivalent of the IATA or AMADEUS systems which allow for seamless booking across airlines. Silver Rail Technologies, a transatlantic startup, is harmonizing rail carriers and their ticketing networks beyond the Franco-British Euro-star and Benalux Thalys trains to reach eastward to Russia and beyond. Today, boarding the Eurostar train at St. Pancras station in London is very much like boarding a plane:check-in, passport control, security X-rays, customs, and “landing cards”—except you never leave the ground, and in fact go under it, crossing one of the narrowest and most strategically contested waterways in European history, the Straits of Dover. The “Chunnel” opening between the U.K. and France was thus as important a symbol of European unity post-World War II as the euro currency (which the U.K. cleverly did not join).

Traveling from Scotland to Singapore (or reverse) by train seems like a gap-year backpacker’s itinerary, or just another endless carefree rite of passage for any Australian. It is undoubtedly the Holy Grail of rail travel: a seamless connection across the furthest distance that could conceivably be traveled on a single rail track.

But it also marks the ultimate compression of geography, smoothly traversing the world’s largest, most diverse and turbulent landmass. The distance from London to Shanghai is the same as London to San Francisco, and Eurasia boasts most of world’s population. It has always been—and will always be—the going concern of geopolitics. Today Eurasia is being densely knit together through an infrastructural exoskeleton of railways and pipelines: Iron Silk Roads.

Today’s Eurasian railways are connecting East and West at unprecedented speeds. The Harmony Express, currently the world’s fastest train, connects Wuhan and Guangzhou at speeds of 250 mph, so could cover the distance from London to Edinburgh and back in just three hours (today, that journey takes 12 hours). Imagine when China completes negotiations with the 17 countries between itself and Great Britain for a high-speed rail to be completed by 2020. The railway would connect Beijing Central to London St. Pancras in just two to three days. That’s more than twice the distance as from New York to San Francisco in the same amount of time—and likely far greater comfort—than Amtrak.

Over the past decade I’ve made several Eurasian voyages, lengthy journeys that attest to Eurasia’s moniker as the indomitable “world-island.” These include driving across Europe, the Balkans, Turkey and the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea in a beat-up 1990 Volkswagen, in busses across the post-Soviet Turkic Central Asian republics, in a Land Cruiser across all of mountainous (and largely road-less) Tibet and Xinjiang in western China, and driving a hulking, three-ton British Army surplus Land Rover ambulance 11,000 kilometers from London to Mongolia (with the steering wheel on the wrong side). Bumping my head countless times against the roofs of these vehicles, I’ve often thought about how much easier it would be for masses of people to travel by rail than on roads that take much longer to pave and rarely withstand the elements.

And the masses are ready. For 60,000 years, migration has been the face the globalization, facilitated by ever faster transportation and communications technologies. Today, 200 million people are considered expatriates, formally living outside their home countries. Colonialism was a key driver of migrating labor across the British Commonwealth, for example, while voluntary migration brought most of America’s original population across the Atlantic. Recent years have witnessed a further surge of economic migrants not seen since the post-War era. Chinese are wandering inland to new frontier cities for work, Mexicans bypassing America for Canada and even Europe where the currencies are stronger, South Asians to build the new Middle Eastern metropolises of Dubai and Doha—and since the financial crisis, Americans sending their c.v.’s to Shanghai and Singapore hoping for a break (or salvation) in the emerging markets.

As we enter the age of mass commercial rail travel, the movement of people will yet again tip the balance between economic dynamism and depopulated malaise, but also create dislocation in labor markets, social tension, and even political upheaval.

Hail to the rail

China borders more countries than any other nation in the world. Since the Soviet collapse two decades ago, it has diligently sought to settle borders with almost all of its neighbors (except India). In doing so, it has paved the way to literally pave over those borders with roads, railways and pipelines. The long-term consequences amount to nothing less than re-writing international relations for Asia, away from the rigid Western Westphalian system of national sovereignty towards the more traditional pattern of Chinese core-periphery relations that has dominated Asian history since ancient times. The kingdom of Tibet and Uighur Turkic province of Xinjiang (China’s largest state) have already been fully incorporated into the Chinese state. Now the logic applies even to Western allies such as South Korea, and newer partners like Vietnam. Because China doesn’t want war with either Vietnam over the South China Sea or South Korea in the event of a messy North Korean collapse, it is likely to shift course away from the current experimentally aggressive posture back towards the commercial and cultural “smile diplomacy” of the 1990s.

It is ironic that in this age of space-based weapons and cyber-war, rail may still be the most influential tool of geopolitics, as it was
during European empire-building in the 19th century. Indeed, it is rail infrastructure that is the most visible manifestation of China’s western expansion, a five-finger strategy of railways, roads, pipelines, and other supply chains traversing Russia to Europe, Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to Turkmenistan, across Afghanistan to Iran, and traversing Pakistan to the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. Here’s our map of this trend (or try this at home: place your right hand in front of you, palm facing forward and thumb down with fingers stretched widely: the back of your hand is China, your pinkie Russia, and your thumb Pakistan.) When Chinese goods flood the streets of Berlin and Paris, and Middle Eastern oil arrives overland to China instead of through the Straits of Malacca, it will be by such traditional geo-strategic design.

The extensiveness and density of these corridors, the harmonization of rail gauges and accelerating speed of trains, the cooperation of customs officials to diminish visa requirements, and the rising demand for Asian goods across fast-growing frontier markets all add up to a sea change in how we think about Eurasia’s various zones and segmentations. China clearly looks at Eurasia holistically—and opportunistically. In the post-modern Chinese world-view: Mongolia is not land of Genghis Khan but “Mine-Golia;” Turkmenistan not an ancient caravan civilization but a gas station. Along the way, giant and non-descript shopping malls like Dubai’s “Dragon Mart” will be the no-frills industrial caravanserai of the 21stcentury, pulling in goods from across Eurasia and selling them wholesale to cost-conscious travelers in both directions.

In the coming decade, each time a Eurasian regime falls or thaws—and they all will, from Moldova and Belarus to Syria and Iran to Uzbekistan and Myanmar—their societies become under-served markets to be flooded with goods, and their geography a strategic passageway for East-West railways. Many places vie for the moniker “where west meets east”: the Ural Mountains, Istanbul, and Dubai, among others. But the compression of Eurasia through infrastructure makes the East-West dynamic less a tangible place than a transition zone.

This process of compression has the power to marginalize current debates about the identity of today’s struggling post-Soviet nations. Today, Ukraine and Belarus appear caught between European and Russian gravities; tomorrow both will be conduits of thriving East-West commerce. Even Russia, still the world’s largest country on the map, will demographically shrink to the size of Turkey with almost its entire population lying west of the Urals. The Cold War joke seems eerily prescient: “There are no disturbances today on the Sino-Finnish border.”

The geographic compression of Eurasia is occurring faster than political institutions can cope. No multilateral organization such as the European Union (EU) or Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) regulates the new Eurasian land bridge whose map of nodes looks more like a subway map in a rendering created by Chor Pharn Lee, a futurist in the office of Singapore’s prime minister.

Within China, a circular network connects Beijing to major city-clusters such as Shanghai/Nanjing in the east, Pearl River Delta in the south, and interior hubs such as Chongqing. Outside China, westward corridors stretch towards Europe, and undersea links connect to Korea’s southern commercial hub of Busan and Japan’s revitalized port of Fukuoka. To the south, Kuala Lumpur would be the penultimate station, just an hour on high-speed rail from the terminus at Singapore, making the island city-state ever more both a land and sea hub.

Market control

One major reason high-speed rail will spread across Eurasia is that China now builds it. Having previously scrapped its “China Star”
venture, China’s Locomotive & Rolling Stock Industry Corporation (LORIC) now competes internationally for high-speed rail contracts and has signed agreements with Turkey while bidding across Russia. Most of the world’s rail equipment is still manufactured by Western heavyweights Bombardier, Siemens, Alstom, and GE. But like other sectors in which intellectual property has been transferred (or stolen), China has hijacked the intellectual property around high-speed rail as well.

Global power, at least from the Asian perspective, is still very much about population size, natural resource endowments and access, and territorial control. But the mechanisms of control have evolved. As the UCLA geopolitical scholar John Agnew explains, power increasingly derives not from fixed or static control over natural resources within bounded territories, but rather through regimes of “market access” that maximize control over the flows of goods, capital and innovations; market-building rather than empire-building. With railways, oil pipelines, underground fiber-optic cables and other technologies moving resources and capital faster than ever, China does not need to conquer colonies the way the Europeans did; it can simply buy them.

China is building new geopolitical “facts on the ground” all over Asia, from deep-water ports in Sri Lanka to signals intelligence stations in Myanmar to coastal special economic zones in North Korea. Wang Menshu of the Chinese Academy of Engineering has drafted the plans for multiple high-speed rail routes emanating from China. A southern route through Indo-China is already under construction by way of refurbishing the rail systems of smaller and poorer states like Cambodia. High-speed and freight rail plans are already in development to link China to Thailand via Vietnam and Laos. Southern Chinese provincial cities like Kunming then become regional hubs for entire sub-regions of Eurasia. As Myanmar thaws, it could become the strategic arbiter of a significant corridor of Sino-Indian trade as the Asian giants vie to maximize gas exports in either direction. Thailand is planning a wide highway to Katanchanaburi on the Myanmar border from which it will connect to a new port called Dawei. The route roughly follows the old River Kwai death railroad. China wants Dawei to connect the short distance overland to Thailand’s big deep water port of Laem Chabang so it can complete avoid importing oil and other goods via the narrow Straits of Malacca. Geography is no barrier for China, only an obstacle to be surmounted with sturdy infrastructure. Even as suspicion of Chinese motivations and tactics is rising from Myanmar to North Korea, no other investor is willing to undertake such massive projects and absorb such huge risk.

In the 20th century, the world looked to America to provide the “public good” of security; protecting freedom of the seas and the flow of oil. In the 21st century it is infrastructure that is the necessary public good, and it is being largely financed by China. Under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China has pledged tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure modernization funds to its poor, post-Soviet neighbors. As we know from Africa, there is no price too high for China to pay, or infrastructure project it will not subsidize, in exchange for access to oil and minerals.

But while the political friction along what could be a kaleidoscopic Orient Express today remains far too intense even for China, hyper-modernizing Russia’s creaking rail system is the easiest, flattest route for China to pursue in compressing its westward march. Mr. Wang refers to Russia simply as the “Northern Route.” From London to Beijing is just over 5,000 miles; London to Singapore about 6,800.

Before Britain ruled its empire on which the sun never set, Russia had become the largest contiguous territorial power since the Mongols, stretching from Eastern Europe to North America (Alaska) by 1866. Railway expansion enabled Tsar Alexander II to invade outer Manchuria in 1868, and leverage Central Asia and Siberia for supplying Russia’s World War I efforts.

A century and a half later, even as Russia’s vascular system of oil and gas arteries and veins is pumping overtime, its skeletal structure is cracking. Gazprom, which by some estimates provides close to half of the federal tax revenue, takes care to keep up what it needs to keep energy flowing, while Moscow neglects the rest in favor of military modernization for a degenerating army. Russia is far too big for itself. Its population is dwindling to that of Turkey’s (but hardly as young or robust) while consolidating in its European sector west of the Urals, while its GDP is scarcely larger than Holland’s. Its status on a map and its dismal reality are the ultimate geopolitical imbalance, one that is being gradually corrected by the combination of a Chinese influx northward across the Amur River, the thawing of Siberia’s permafrost due to climate change which is making the region a major breadbasket, and the wholesale liquidation (pardon the pun) of Russia’s oil, gas—and increasingly water—through multi-billion dollar agreements with China. Russia exists to fuel China and Europe – and increasingly to connect them as China modernizes Russian rail.

On CNN International today, you’ll frequently see a commercial for Russian Railways showing a stylized map with a zigzagging rail route linking Western Europe to eastern Russia. The impression given is of a Russian seamlessly traversed for Eurasian business. And it will be – but thanks to China. China’s “Northern Route” is nothing less than an overhaul of the Trans-Siberian railway, whose lore now far surpasses its reality. Portway once wrote, “I was happy to wax eloquent on the subject of the Trans-Siberian Railway, but can find little to praise in the cities it serves.” China’s influx of passengers and consumers will re-invent the hulking over-wraught frontier outputs such as Novosibirsk, while its tourists will surely over-run attractions like Lake Baikal. China wants to resurrect and extend the Baikal-Amur branch of the Trans-Siberian, which borders the 100 million strong Heilongjiang province, to smooth the import of all the aluminum and other metals it is investing in with Russian oligarchs.

As with the modern project of the European Union itself, infrastructure across civilizational boundaries is about boosting trade, creating energy corridors, promoting cultural exchange, and reshaping politics all at the same time. Consider how it used to take six weeks to deliver freight on trucks from Slovenia’s port of Koper to Istanbul due to Balkan checkpoints. Now as each former Yugoslavian republic has Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU, they have been forced to play nice to receive substantial grants for infrastructural renewal from Brussels. Now customs procedures don’t hold up cargo as it covers the distance in less than two days. Another strategic waterway is also about to be tunneled by rail: the Bosporus Straits that divides Istanbul – and with it separate Asia from Europe – will also have an underground rail connection called “Marmaray” (uniting the Turkish words for Marmara Sea and “rail”). Set to begin operations in 2014, it is projected to increase rail traffic in congested Istanbul from 3.6% to over 27%.

Further eastward into the Caucasus, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline already provides a growing share of Europe’s oil imports from the Caspian Sea to Turkey, and a major EU-funded road and rail project (called “Traceca”) has boosted cooperation among traditional rivals like Georgia and Azerbaijan. This Southern Silk Road, then, is simultaneously an economic development program, political stabilization tool, and vehicle for expanding the EU all at once.

Where pipelines speed the flow of oil and gas, railways often follow. By 2018, the Nabucco pipeline may also be completed, carrying Kurdish, Azeri, and even potentially Iranian gas all the way to Europe. In the other direction, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines will further reduce the isolation of landlocked Central Asia and bring Caspian resources outward to world markets. The crucial state in these schemes – Iran – is one of the world’s top oil and gas suppliers and cannot be isolated forever. Already a freight rail corridor links Istanbul to Islamabad via Iran, carrying $15 billion in goods annually. Eventually, through war or diplomacy, Iran’s resource and demographic energy will be unlocked as well.

America’s isolation

America’s much-touted “pivot” to Asia is not without justification, but it might be without foundation. In other words, America cannot properly engage Asia only across the Pacific; it needs to look across the Atlantic as well. A decade ago, Henry Kissinger warned that, “The U.S., separated from Europe, is geopolitically an island off the shores of Eurasia like nineteenth-century Britain.” As China steams westward across Eurasia, the U.S. needs a unified and expanding European Union to serve as a continental counterweight. Indeed, unless we re-conceive the entire notion of the “West” as a three-pillared zone of Europe, North America, and even South America, the clichés about the indomitable East dominating the Earth will become certain prophecies. Much as a half-century ago when NATO and the EU served as the strategic and political bulwarks against the westward expansion of communism. That task may still be necessary, even though China is communist only in name.

Kissinger’s book was titled Does America Need a Foreign Policy? It does, of course, but that does not mean it has one. Understanding the fundamental importance of global strategy for America is as basic as looking at a globe. America is actually in the wrong time zone. It is the last major power to complete the day, perpetually chasing the rest of the world in time. The late Citibank executive Walter Wriston famously prophesized that, “Time zones are more important than borders.” He meant it as a statement about the power of global markets. But it also says a lot of America’s future position in a world where more people may be traveling across Eurasia by rail than flying across the Atlantic to America.

American scholars use terms like “global disorder” to characterize the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world simply because they refuse to appreciate the order that is in fact emerging before our eyes and being built every day. The more Eurasia organically knits itself together, the more America appears an insular island on the other side of the world from this epochal new order.

So this is what the most important landmass on Earth will look like in a post-American world.

In theory, America’s weakening leverage over Eurasia should mean that rivalries should explode between China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and India. But Asia need not become a chaotic vortex in need of American intervention—which in any case has a recent track record of producing chaotic vortexes. Instead, Asia’s future could be much like its past: the bumpy re-emergence of centuries old Silk Roads. The smoothest paths will be Asian financed railways efficiently ferrying the world’s largest populations of the East across and towards the depopulating zones of the West. In Portway’s day, the trains seemed to run on time everywhere, except in Britain. Under Chinese control, the trains will surely run on time everywhere.

As all of this transpires, America will be fine. Its navy will still be parked off the Pacific Rim, able to bail-out and back-up some allies who get into confrontations with China, while taking a beating in the process. Back home, shale gas will bring down prices at the pump, and if the government can redistribute rents towards infrastructure renewal, the economy will rebound more equitably than either the dot-com or finance booms. And the Western Hemisphere may also unite, a dream as old as that to control the Eurasian heartland. Until the tectonic plates collide again.

Author: Parag Khanna / Publisher: SCMO

 

Goldilocks: For Mature Audiences Only

Published by Transport Trackers on 20 March 2012 and reproduced by courtesy of Charles de Trenck

  • Global growth is back… or is it?
  • The 90s-00s had seen a 10% rate of containerization
  • In a real sense the Greenspan Illusion 2002-07 was +2-3%
  • Peak distortion was +5%
  • Until the ‘00s acceleration containerization centered around 8%
  • Recently averages have been closer to 5%
  • Our working assumption is long term 7%, short term 4-7%
  • Med-case on vessel supply is normalization by 2016
  • We are at about 1m TEU of capacity marginalized now
  • We also have many quasi-obsolete ships….
  • Obsolescence can be down to wrong size ship
  • Gap between weak and strong is huge (operational and financial)

Figure 1: Mapping Deviations From Long Term Growth, ’95 – ‘ 12E

Source: Transport Trackers

Source: Transport Trackers

Containerization: A New Phase of Lower Growth Since 2008…

Goldilocks… For Mature Audiences Only. We’ve been dying to use this title. Growth has decelerated long term. In essence we are in Year 3 of China’s export story deceleration. And yet, the US is now recovering a little better than expected 6 months and Europe has stabilized a little. A recovery US economy has raised a lot of hopes.  But this is not an ordinary recovery by any stretch. Not in terms of economic activity and neither in terms of container shipping.
The bad news for some time has been there are too many ships. The silver lining is that there are too many of the wrong ships out there. But to get to the silver lining we still need the consolidation of the coming years. Keynesian over-spending has not helped, as it has kept demand artificially higher, which may offer false hope to owners of certain vessel types.

Some vessel owners and operators have pointed out that the average useful life of vessels in coming years could fall to 20 years from 25 years. Of course we are not going to get accountants and owners to recognize this. But effectively there are many ship types that could head to the scrap heaps given small nudges. Many ships in the range of 5,000 – 6,000 TEU could be severely marginalized if they consume too much fuel or are owned by financially weak owners. At the moment, according to Alphaliner and others, we are at about 1m TEU of idled vessel capacity. This is against a standing fleet of about 15.5m TEU according to March 2012 Clarkson data.

Here is what the fleet growth looks like long term. The dotted red line is the long term trend. The bold red line is the actual capacity data. The problem was the bold line exceed the long term trend just as demand decelerated globally – meaning the problem is not fully over unless demand really takes off (and more vessels taken out). We may have strong players come out better, and we may have rebounds. But a full cleaning is still needed.

Figure 2: Container Capacity Growth in TEU, 1994-12E

 

Sources: Clarksons; Transport Trackers

Sources: Clarksons; Transport Trackers

The problem of too many ships is not going away unless 2012-13 sees a very strong economic recovery leading container demand to jump from 4-7% to above 10%. When we overlay demand onto capacity the problem crystalizes.

Figure 3: Long Term Demand vs Supply… and the big gaps, 1995 – 2012E

 

Sources: Clarksons; CI; Carriers; Transport Trackers

Sources: Clarksons; CI; Carriers; Transport Trackers

In terms of vessel supply there are too many ships headed for the long-haul trades. We have all known this. However, there is one small positive structuraldevelopment, though there are still too many ships. Recently, most analysts would have said that 10,000+TEU ships were ALL headed for the Asia-Europe trade. But this month MSC deployed a 12,000TEU vessel into the Transpacific, which offers the potential for less ships to flood into the Asia-Europe in this critical 2012-13 period (when there are too many of these ships). However, it is still not expected that there will be a flood of 10,000+ TEU ships flowing into the Transpacific before 2014-16, as most terminals will be able to properly handle these ships.

Nonetheless this is a small positive development.  Back to reality: About 50% of vessels in the orderbook are 10,000+ TEU ships. In terms of the 2012 orderbook, which will still be at least a couple percent above demand there is little that can be done as most ships are close to fully paid. But by 2013-14, we should expect the orderbook to be stretched out into further years. And by 2015-16, we should have been through the difficult period of dealing with marginal tonnage and experience better demand – supply balance. Unless… (play Jaws music here). One significant difference will be the capex gambits will cost more with 10,000+ TEU and 14,000+ TEU ships, narrowing the field of players.

For the immediate future here is a snapshot of the fleet distribution and orderbook, with a focus on seeing (upper pie chart) that there are a lot of 4,000 – 7,500TEU ships (about 40%) in fleet which may have trouble identifying their use, especially if fuel consumption is not good. And then, in the orderbook (lower pie chart), there is a need to focus on about half being 10,000+TEU ships destined for long-hauls.

Figure 4: Types of Ships in the Fleet (10,000+ TEU at 10%..., but…)

 

Sources: Alphaliners

Sources: Alphaliners

Figure 5: Types of Ships on Order(…just about half are 10,000+ TEU…so still a problem ‘12-‘13)

Sources: Alphaliners

Sources: Alphaliners

And here is a snapshot by carriers:

Figure 6: World Fleet and Orderbook Distribution in TEU (Jan/Feb 2012)

 

Sources: CI; Transport Trackers

Sources: CI; Transport Trackers

It is interesting to see that the top 5 and top 10 generally have larger than average ships on order than the world fleet. On average a ship on order has a profile of 7,275TEU per ship – but 3 of 4 13,000 TEU per ship avg size orders for their OB are in the top 10. CMA, Hapag and Hanjin pop up as having the greatest concentrations of big ships on order. This can mean different things of course, without further analysis, but generally speaking it means that their wagers were in the long haul and Asia-Europe trades. So, who will still feel the need to order more? For delivery when? Will they have the patience to wait for 2015-16?

Demand and Rates

Our view was that the negative volume momentum data was running out in 4Q11 and it was a 50-50 shot as to the base would build higher or stay flat. It depended somewhat on equities and how people felt following a long bout of declining demand growth post the big post crisis rebound. Asia-Europe we expected, and still expect, to be a little weaker than the US. 2012 at the moment should see mid-single digit demand growth long haul, coming up from zero growth experienced into end 2011.

Figure 7: Long Haul Container Demand Growth, Jan ’06 – 1H12E

 

Sources: FEFC; CTS; JOC; Transport Trackers

Sources: FEFC; CTS; JOC; Transport Trackers

For Rates, we agree they have/had to move up, but…. We are in the part coming from the bottom of the cycle where rate increments – “GRIs” – should have some success. However, it is always pretty much about partial, not full implementations. So given that rates in 2011 fell about 9%  across the board while nominal fuel costs rose some 30%, it makes complete sense rates should rebound.

Below is our long term tracking of global rates

Figure 8: Global Average Rates and Long Haul ex-Asia Rates vs Global Demand, in Percent 1980 -2012E

 

Sources: CI; Carriers;Transport Trackers

Sources: CI; Carriers;Transport Trackers

Rates out of Asia will rebound faster than global rates, as is the usual pattern. But also higher rates are “merely” recouping the lost ground from higher bunker fuel prices. In fact 380 CST bunker is pretty much at record levels above $730/ton, which is where they were in 2008 when WTI was at $140+ versus current $100+. Of course there has been the Cushing oversupply issue. But also this has meant hedging has not been effective. Brent also was still higher in 2008 peaks than current levels. The issue of bunker costs and vessel efficiency is an entire report by itself. But we would emphasize that players with better fuel utilization ships will do better than those operating legacy ships. At the moment we are looking at bunker usage being about 30% more efficient on newer design vessels. If oil prices stay high this will offer an immense advantage to those positioned with more efficient vessels.

Author: Charles de Trenck / Publisher: SCMO

The Next Phase of Deflation in Container Shipping & Container Box Drivers

Reproduced from a 9 March 2011 article by courtesy of "Transport Trackers"

We are still in the growth deceleration conundrum in the after-party hangover of successive US consumer booms. 2010 was the rebound and 2011 will be a consolidation, with oil price levels dictating whether growth is flat or as high as a few percent. Longer term, the challenge remains for container growth to find a new growth level such as 7%, down from 10% averages of yesteryear – but there is a twist. And this could be the success of growth in new production regions such as inland China, which could direct growth into a new direction.

Wal Mart’s share price, somewhat ironically, has been in a funk since its peak levels in 1999. In a sense the stock took off when investors got the memo on cheap China goods – a bit late in 1997 when they could have gotten it in 1993-94 as China’s manufacturing production really geared up following Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum “it does not matter what color the cat is…” in the Spring of 1992 – and his tour of South China (where the breadbasket of cheap China goods production originated). Two med-term risks: 1) war, with risks rising and 2) significant increases in domestic US and developed country local goods production (cheaper domestic production).

By 2003, WMT’s share price started to underperform the market overall, and did so until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. Since then it has traded places back and forth. What is interesting to us is how this company reflected in the biggest way the margin gains that could come from passing on lower prices to US consumers on the back of cheap China goods while earning a spread on high volumes. The volume growth story, from the chart, is best seen from 1996 through to 2005-06, when the boom in furniture for US cheaply financed homes peaked, and when the concept that China goods prices would not fall forever caught on and the US consumer started getting buying fatigue.

Our long-term thesis is that “global capitalism” could receive an injection of new life in a few years from now – after some consolidation shorter term – as new cheap production bases come on line to assist western governments and supply chain margins in their strange targeted mix of goods deflation and assets reflation. The topic is obviously complex. We discuss the supply chain perspective here in looking at containers and container shipping – and the potential for a return to goods deflation.

Wal Mart and Container Trade Volumes from Asia to US – A structural challenge anticipated by the stock substantially in advance?

Source: Transport Trackers

Source: Transport Trackers

Question: 200m new workers needed in China?

It is easy to churn out general reports summarizing the broad movements and shifts of container box and ship fleets, and to prognosticate on long term container growth and shorter term variances – especially when one takes the recent year to repeat the current trend for the forecast, … which we have often seen done. And we don’t claim to be able to do much better in using crystal balls.

To do much more than look six months forward is highly interpretive and subject to rapid changes in forecasts. Typically we find there are 1) differing stages in a long term cycle where calling a bottom after a sell-off and a correction after a run-up are a little easier to catch; and 2) annual seasonal patterns when it is easier to call the forward few months in the middle of the year than the next year right before the Christmas season. We are currently about two years out of the bottom if we can call spring 2009 the bottom of the 2008 financial crisis. This crisis, having been broader, led to more 1:1 correlations on both corrections and rebounds. In addition, this 1:1 for correlation 2008-10 saw the China ports pattern as much more similar to global trade patterns.

Key Directional Trends 2011(Container risks 2011 already stated. This is a re-statement)

From Henry Boyd, we have gained insights into the consolidation process in container boxes. Henry has taken his analysis further than what we have seen Drewry or CI (Containerization International) do. But Henry, as for all others, still relies on some CI data, especially for long term series. We at Transport Trackers had relied on the CI data for over a decade, supplemented by Drewry, and now also Henry. The series at times do show variances – but the patterns are essentially the same.

*****
Container Box Dynamics

In 2010, approximately 2.75 million TEU were produced.  With adjustments for retirements and containers built for non-commercial maritime use, the world container fleet stood at roughly 24.5 million TEU (about 27m using un-adjusted Drewry series).  With a net increase of the number of vessel slot TEU to 14. 2 - 14.3 m TEU, the box/slot ratio dropped to 1.8:1.0 on Henry Boyd’s count. Alphaliner, which picked up our theme this week as well is working off of a 1.99:1.00 box to slot ratio for 2011. Our relatively less adjusted count for Transport Trackers (which looks closer to some presentations such as those of Alphaliner) showed the generic box/slot ratio stood at 2.1x and about flat on 2009, after coming off from 2.3x in 2008 – with the 2011 ratio at about 2.1x as well. The decade average is about 2.4 -2.5x.

Container TEU Production and Production Utilization, 1995- 2011 (2011 = estimated minimum need)

Source: CI; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Source: CI; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Container $/TEU Prices and Daily Long Term Lease Rates… a 20+ year decline reversed in ’09…and a big spike it was

Sources: CI; industry reports; Transport Trackers

Sources: CI; industry reports; Transport Trackers

The baseline 20’ container price started 2010 at USD $2,000 (few delivered at this price), peaked at $2,820 for September deliveries and settled back to close the year at $ 2,700.00.  The dramatic swing in pricing was caused solely by demand for scarce production as both corten steel and plywood flooring prices stayed stable throughout the year.  These two items alone account for 60% of the 20’ price.  Additionally because refrigerated container production continued through 2009 without interruption, pricing remained stable at the 2009 level through 2010.

The container manufacturing industry started 2010 with an almost non-existent production workforce having furloughed most of its employee base during the 13-14 months the factories were closed from late 2008 through the end of 2009.  This required the manufacturers to recruit and train complete workforces.  Their efforts were further hampered by difficulties in retaining workers who prefer assembling consumer products to working on a heavy industrial shop floor.  As a result, 2010’s production was almost completely based on single shift production.

Once the manufacturing industry’s workforce is re-built to support a two shift environment a full order book annual production capacity should be in the 5.0 to 6.0 million TEU range a substantial increase from where things stood at the end of 2008, a result of production line improvements and expansion during the 2009 hiatus.

The implication of strong pricing and full order book suggest that while 2010 might not go down in the record books as the year with greatest production, it may definitely be the most profitable for the manufacturers (or at least in 1H11 based on momentum).  This has given rise to a number of comments from the purchasing community that the shortage of suitable workers may not be as acute as portrayed by the manufacturers.

Going forward in 2011 the container order book looks strong buoyed by the new vessels that have, and will, enter service.  

There have been claims that 2011 will be a record year for box production, suggesting the manufacturers will be able to fully implement two shift work schedules and get to 4m TEU production levels (2007: approx 4.1m TEU produced).  

We are skeptical this will happen in 2011 for a number of reasons:  

1)    From an engineering perspective, we believe the container manufacturing workforce is too inexperienced.  Multi shift production requires a strong cadre of experienced floor supervisors.  Line workers can be easily, and relatively quickly, trained.  Line foremen need work experience.  With the bulk of the production workforce having less than a year of experience, the pool for supervisory staff looks thin;  
2)    More importantly the manufacturers seem to have learned the lesson of supply and demand, with demand being preferable to oversupply;
3)    Capital raising constraints may still limit smaller players from raising all the money they need, though the big players have had a field day squeezing out the little guys.

Representing a turnaround from recent years, container leasing players moved to dominate purchases and acquired 60% of 2010’s production.  Leasing companies made a wise tactical move in 2010 and purchased production space early in to lock out competitors and customers alike.  With production under contract, the leasing industry was able to successfully pass along not only increases in lease rate attributable to container price changes, but also increase their profit margin.  This is evidenced by the growth in the ICIR (Initial Cash Investment Return - per diem x 365 / asset cost) metric from 12.5% in 1Q10 to 14.3% at year’s end on dry freight equipment for five year operating leases.

Reefer lease rates also remained stable at the 2009 levels in line with unit pricing.
All of the leasing companies were reporting utilization levels in excess of 97% by year’s end.  In a global equipment rental business this means that everything that can possibly work, is working.  While good news for the lessors, this also has an impact on the value of used containers.  Leasing companies are the market leaders in the sale of used equipment, choosing to dispose of equipment before its useful life is over to maximize gain on sale profit and to keep the age of their fleets low.  However, when lease utilizations go up, the available pool of saleable containers goes down and prices go up.

2009 and 2010 suggest to us a number of things.  Firstly, the era of cheap containers is over for now (our TT view is the market comes off from high base during 2011, while the perception of tightness from 2010 lingers...Longer term we expect box demand to increase relative to ship slots again given a low box to slot ranging from 1.8x to 2.1x).

Our thought is that containers have come full circle and are for now at least being built and marketed as transportation equipment, and not as a mechanism to freely export steel and gain hard currency.  With this change in point of view, and clear evidence that the manufacturers finally “get” supply and demand, the days of below cost containers to keep factories running will become a memory for awhile longer (and set us up for a new cycle – a look at long term IRR and lease rate charts from the 1980s must be seen to fully appreciate what hit container yields in the last 20 years!).

While the order book demand will be strong, we find it hard to believe the manufacturers will either be able, or willing, to increase 2011’s production level much beyond 20-25% of the 2010 level, orto 3.3 - 3.5 million TEU (and not 4.0+ m TEU as some have called for).  But 2012 delivery levels can be debated more. We also believe the leasing industry will be on the forefront of purchases again in 2011 as it still positions to get back some of the lost market share from past years.  Again, they will be using their purchase orders as a competitive advantage to block out liner company purchases. We also see lease utilizations staying high through 2011 and in turn propping up used equipment values. High oil prices and consumer demand levels and potential high oil price impact on consumption should be a major point of debate on demand impact for 2H11 into 2012.

Not Surprising Similar $ Cost Shifts, 1980 – 2012E (TT View: price rebound highs in 2010…but where settle is key)

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Final Thoughts on Boxes

There are many who for 18 months have said that container box shortages would only last a short while, and we sided with this view initially in its strict form (ie, boxes are a commodity that are relatively quickly brought back to equilibrium), by mid-10 we had a more modified view which was that the perception of scarcity would create the same effect as a shortage.
We have believed since mid-10 that this shortage mentality would last through much of 2011 – driven by some of the smaller container line players we spoke to. However the issue now to watch is how it lasts as we go in to the peak season, and if it fades faster than expected.
High oil price and lower demand growth in long haul with slightly lower vessel utilizations could take the pressure off box needs short term.

Longer term there is another effect that could come into play, which is a lengthening of the supply chain as more boxes go inland into China. But this will be something to watch further down the road. We still have the aftershocks of 2007-09 to understand shorter term.
In closing the discussion we note a few write ups talking up the shortage of boxes again in the last two weeks – this is strategic mumbo jumbo positioning by the lines first, and a continuing or an attempt at continuation of the recent trend on tight boxes second. Yes – there is still some tightness. But 1) we are farther along in terms of this effect and it is not as severe as in 2010 and 2) we have yet to fully digest higher oil prices due to the current N Africa/Arabia crisis.

Ships and Boxes Looked at Together

BOX TURNS: Partly Logical Given Trade Pattern Shifts … but also Partly Puzzling (the divergence in 2002-05…)
(Initially greater box efficiencies, higher trans-shipment/more double counting…Less boxes inland US….Slow Steaming…But later more boxes inland China?)

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

The curve separation between box turns (box trade over standing vessel TEU) and the ratio of standing box fleet to standing vessel TEU during 2002-09 can be partly explained by what happened during this 2004+ period was a tendency for box turns to decline partly due to greater growth on the longer Asia-Europe trade as well as the earlier deceleration in the shorter Transpacific trade. The peak of growth in the Transpacific Eastbound was about +17% in 2004. Asia-Europe peaked in 2006 at about 22% (subject to variances on exact % growth). The trend may also be attributable tolarge volumes of inventory containers that were ‘exported’ as empties in excess of import levels from N. Americaand Europe in this time period.

What gets interesting is when we look at relationships few have looked at before – like the ratio of capex for ships to that of boxes. The alternate ship capex to box capex (dark red line below) and the trendline show the privileging of capex deployment for ships over boxes, which goes hand in hand with less boxes available per vessel TEU slot.

Vessel Capex Got Out of Hand Relative to Boxes for Little While (LT trend also a little out of whack)

 

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Source: CI; Clarksons; Drewry; Transport Trackers

Getting Back to Container Shipping

When we get back to looking at container shipping, using our long term graphs, which admittedly always have to rely on paucity of data in earlier years, we establish a few clear trends:
1)    The increased volatility of capacity, demand and rates in recent years (last seen in 80s), and,
2)    A general long term trend toward rates to react to excess capacity increases and decreases

What we find to be generally the case is we don’t even need to adjust and make assumptions which require constant fine tuning for all the explanations, theories and pattern shifts thrown out there, including most notably the famous case a few year ago of needing to adjust down effective slots more on bigger ships, increased trans-shipment long term, shifts in growth and deceleration in longer haul trades, and most recently slow steaming. Slow steaming, we think, has had the greatest effect in terms of absorbing excess capacity. Yet even with this, the relationships between “excess slots” (capacity growing in excess of demand growth) and $/TEU rates for container lines is still noticeable.

WARNING: Rates do Respond to Visible Excess Capacity (black arrows point to capacity surges; purple arrows to drops)

Source: Transport Trackers    Note: of course the whipsaw action set up 2008+ given greater volatility… (again we would like to thank Mr Greenspan….)

Source: Transport Trackers    
Note: of course the whipsaw action set up 2008+ given greater volatility… (again we would like to thank Mr Greenspan….)

Long Term TEU Liftings Demand and Vessel TEU Supply, 1981 -2013E

 

Source: Transport Trackers   

Source: Transport Trackers   

MAD Shipping V1.2 and the Long Term Implications of the Maersk Move….”Please ante up”

These are macro driven pivotal moments we live for. The implications of these forthcoming changes cannot be over-emphasized and will possibly be useful for building and adjusting investment strategies for several years. We have mentioned that ports tend to benefit more from this development, all things equal, as well of course being more defensive historically. But certain equipment makers from yards to crane makers will receive a share of benefits. (When we mention ports we are not supporting one type of port per se, and certainly not S China ports relative to others, for instance. Re the Hutch Ports story, for instance, this case will have its own set of parameters to consider.)

The oil trade: These vessel size and capex developments will be separate from another trend we have seen come back which is the container shipping trading pattern with oil trade, which could show more similarity with airline share fluctuations around oil price moves. The "oil related trade" will have its own life, although the topic is connected at a deeper level in terms of operating costs analysis of course. Higher oil impacts operation costs – and older vessels will face higher costs if oil stays at a higher level.

***

1. Reiterating our more recent 2011 bearish comments on containers, and
2. Based on discussions which brought it all together for us…,
3. But cognizant that some players in addition to or in spite of Maersk could benefit
4. Underscoring that a next wave of mergers or closer alliance could come out of this as well…

It is our hope that many investors and shipping lines will conduct further investigations into the risks of a vessel arms race at this juncture. On the one hand it is compelling to go for the latest toy and reduce unit costs. On the other hand it could lead to a shorter useful life for many vessel types resulting in more wasted capex to throw under the rug of balance sheets.

Bottom line: Maersk with their new 18,000TEU ship (which was flagged as early as Nov 10) have raised the stakes and raised the bar to stay the leader in the game, using a) their economies of scale and b) profits from other divisions as buffers, and indicated their willingness to continue facing huge swings in EBITDA and EBIT from continued turbocharging of the cyclical nature of shipping and container shipping to attempt yet again to squeeze out key competitors. A tough challenge to be sure.

Relative Stay in Game players: The Asian carriers, mainly HK, Taiwan and Chinese will have to follow and will have the benefit of access to cheap capital to chase Maersk with their own capex strategies. ... The Europeans and related will not be so lucky, but will have to chase as much as they can. No surprises here.

Ship owner vs ship operator:  Shipowners who put too many eggs in the 2006-08 part of the capex cycle will face obsolence issues on assets they overpaid and which will exhibit higher operating costs if oil remains high. Shipowners with earlier purchased vessels, depending on acquisition price, will also be impacted. Take a 2005 ship that was valued initially partly with a 7-year or more charter. When the ship comes off charter it will be returning to a different world, one which no longer pays it the same charter rate level.

Ship operators will be affected too – in a similar way that bond holders can be affected by a change in the structure of interest rates between long and short maturities.... or by changes in debt credit ratings. Issues of fleet profile must be considered carefully -- THE QUESTION: How is the current vessel portfolio between owned and long term charters affected in terms of the ongoing run rate of committed capital and operating costs?

The relative winners: key Korean yards on a relative basis and a couple of Chinese yards who can benefit at the margin. Equipment makers and dredging and engineering companies.

Retooling likely vessel deployments: 10,000 TEU ships could become the choice vessel to US West Coast and the 8,500TEU (2014 Panama Canal) to East Coast for premium services (Virginia the only post panamax ready port currently… and funding issues for others to consider). 14,000TEU and 18,000 TEU ships will be the cost winners for Asia Europe. Cascading, the act of shifting a once large ship from long haul into short haul, will be accelerated. But this will face its own issues and problems. The issues will percent of fleets that can shift over what time frame. Some argue that all obsolete ships will be automatically scrapped. Would it be so easy. Unfortunately this will not happen overnight and will be a drag on vessel utilizations and returns before the scrapping decision gets made.

The irony: After over-spending on capex in 2006-08 the liners are faced with the prospect of doing it all over again or face competitive obsolescence. The traditional scavenger strategy will be tried by MSC and others who may seek to emulate this strategy – which could be to make up for not having the lower operating costs by getting cheapships AFTER the loss of value of the newly obsolete models. Who knows, it could be that some of the top 10 lines could be further pushed to merge together. Some of the obvious combinations could come back out of necessity.

Historically we have seen certain favorite shiptypes shift. For instance the early 5000-5500 TEU ships will become more obsolete. The relatively new 6000-6500 TEU ships will face the risk of becoming part of a sandwich class. Ships that cannot be properly cascaded will be the ones facing the bigger discounts – which will then become either scrap or scavenger targets.

The face of Intra-Asia trade will shift yet again. Bigger ships. New needs for smaller ports. Shifting feeder relationships.

The irony here is also that all these operators and the industry in general have all moved from 18-20 year type depreciation schedules toward 25 year type depreciation policies in the last decade or so – and yet here we will be with ships built in 2004 which are or were perfectly good ships which will effectively be deserving of an economic impairment charge …. Which of course will be resisted or denied by auditors, banks, owners, and operators.

Plus ca change… There are still a few rough edges as we work on further updates on long term implications.

The Plan to Bankrupt the Competition and Create a New Vessel Arms Race … MAD Shipping for Short

A new version of “we must remain #1” updated for new technology and new economies of scale was born in late 2010, as we initially followed early reports DSME was readying a new vessel design for Maersk to start delivering in 2013. The new 18,000TEU vessel design was too big to contain and came clean a few weeks ago. The only trade for the vessels was always going to be the Asia-Europe trade, of course. The Transpacific will have to content itself with 8,500TEU and 10,000TEU in the near future. The perversity and beauty of the game is that large liner companies will be forced to match the economies of scale in key East-West trade lanes or not be able to match prices which come from lower slot, fuel and operating costs per TEU slot.

Triple E 400 meters $190m 18,000TEU (a few meters longer and wider, but with square bottom and 23 across the ship carries lot more than 15,000TEU Emma Maersk)

Source: Maersk         Please visithttp://www.maerskline.com/triple-e and   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fxFs5LpDsQU

Source: Maersk         Please visithttp://www.maerskline.com/triple-e and   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fxFs5LpDsQU

Total World Domination…the Winners and Losers

Source: James Bond, Never Say Never Again

Source: James Bond, Never Say Never Again

The Triple-E in its push to innovate will feature:

  • 20 % less CO2 per container moved than Emma Mærsk, believed to be the most efficient container vessel in operation today and 50 % less CO2 per container moved than the industry average on the Asia–Europe trade lane;
  • 35 % less fuel consumed per container than the 13,100 TEU vessels being delivered to other container shipping lines in the next few years;
  • Ultra long stroke engine waste heat recovery system captures and reuses energy from the engines’ exhaust gas for extra propulsion with less fuel consumption. Power to engine will be increased 9% (some debate, but some complaints…);
  • Hull and propulsion systems are designed to profit from slow steaming, rendering fuel consumption benefits of 20 % at 22.5 knots, 37 % at 20 knots and 50 % at 17.5 knots;
  • E class vessels will be documented and mapped in the vessel’s ‘cradle-to-cradle passport’. When the vessel is retired from service, this document will ensure that all materials can be reused, recycled or disposed of;
  • $190m vessel implies $10,555/TEU capacity slot cost (and it would be cheaper with less innovation)

 The Slot cost comparisons are pretty clear from a capital deployment per unit of TEU slot capacity. There was spike up in costs/TEU a few years ago. Now there is a double shift down again: The first shift down is lower cost per ship and per TEU slot due to the after effects of the financial crisis and the second shift is from the renewed upsizing bias.

TEU Slot Costs by Vessel Size, 1980 – 2013E ….The difference is about 30%....but that is only half the story

Sources: Clarksons; Market reports; Transport Trackers

Sources: Clarksons; Market reports; Transport Trackers

What Comes after Maersk's Triple-E Containerships?    

If the Maersk “Triple-E” containership order makes a large slice of the world’s fleet uncompetitive, what will the future threat to the Maersk triple E look like? We can assume very different configuration for containerships in the not very far distant future?

According to recent work by the Norwegian classification society DNV; “the low energy ships of the future will be larger, be made of lighter materials, carry little or no ballast water and be equipped with a host of different measures attempting to minimize fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.”

Their description also includes:

  • drag reduction technologies
  • hybrid lightweight materials
  • multi-propulsor configurations
  • and hull design features such as “trapezoidal” hulls

Technologies that were considered too expensive just a few years ago are now becoming cost efficient.

Whilst DNV and other support the LNG option for propulsion, they also promote the concept of the electric ship that they expect will boast this set of ten technologies:

  • Parallel hybrid power generation (where the electric motor acts on the drive shaft in parallel with the engine)
  • Super-capacitors for higher energy density
  • Large lithium batteries
  • Fuel cells
  • Solar panels
  • Flywheels that provide rotational energy
  • Retractable wind turbines
  • Wave energy collectors
  • Cold ironing in port
  • Superconducting generators and motors

The electric ship suggestion is in contrast to the claim by classification societies are saying that LNG fuel engines are virtually way that the next wave of low sulphur rules can be met.

By 2015, Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs), which are established in environmentally sensitive areas in Europe and North America, will set the maximum SOx levels at 0.01% versus the current level of 0.1%  LNG would eliminate all SOx and particulate matter, cut NOx by 90% and CO2 by 20%.

To date, the experience of using LNG in ships is limited to ferries and offshore support vessels, but the propulsion system will be extended to coastal and short sea ships, of which a half dozen are now on order. Of note a first small 2,000 dwt capacity vessel with LNG fuel was ordered by an owner who was chasing the potential savings, rather than environmental concerns. The Norwegian NOx fund will provide NOK18m of the additional NOK28m. Built in a Turkish shipyard, once delivered in 2012, the vessel will be supplied weekly by a local LNG bunker station.

There is European money for the gas solution. One Danish owner, Fjordline , has secured EUR9m ($12.4m) in European Union funding to install liquefied natural gas tanks and dual fuel engines on two ferries being built in Poland. The funds, yet to be received, come from the Marco Polo scheme, which falls under Brussels’ Motorways of the Sea program. The Finnish government backed LNG fuel capabilities on a new Viking Line ferry to be built at STX Finland this year. The only other sizeable vessels to be ordered with LNG as a fuel are two ro-ros from Norway’s SeaCargo. Again, the additional building expense has been supported by the Norwegian NOx fund.

There has, as yet, been no commercial order for a gas-powered vessel in northern Europe in which the owner has not tapped into some form of financial aid to build the vessel.
There was some speculation that Maersk’s Triple E ships would be LNG fuelled but the containership segment is far away from the day of an LNGbecause the industry is stuck in a chicken and egg situation. The fuel suppliers won’t provide the ready supply of fuel until the fleet is there to buy the fuel and the owners won’t buy LNG fuelled vessels until the fuel supply is there.

The solution from DNV is that container ships should be built today with the capacity to retrofit with LNG storage tanks so that when the world has an LNG bunker network, then the ships can be refitted quickly.

DNV has also unveiled “a new crude oil tanker concept that is fuelled by liquefied natural gas, has a hull shape that removes the need for ballast water and will almost eliminate local air pollution.” There are some parties holding out hope for scrubbers to solve the sulphur problem.

Wärtsilä, one of the marine industry’s leading ship power solutions providers, has signed a turnkey contract with Containerships Ltd Oy to retrofit a Wärtsilä fresh water scrubber onto a small containership. This is Wärtsilä’s first commercial marine scrubber project for a main engine. The scrubber will be delivered to the customer in August 2011. The conversion will enable the vessel to meet future sulphur oxides (SOx) emission requirements in Sulphur Emission Control Areas.

In addition to LNG, there is a serious consideration for LPG because it does not require the low-temperature storage technology, thereby doing away with some of the problems peculiar to LNG engines.

The low sulphur rules will create new challenges for shipping, not to mention the burden that shipping will have to bear from the surge in oil prices.  We are also aware that shipping is squarely in the cross hairs as a politically easy target due to its green house gas (GHG) footprint.

Appendix – China Ports Snapshots

China Vs World ‘000 TEU and Greater China as % of World, 1993 - 2010

Source: Transport Trackers

Source: Transport Trackers

Where’s the Growth? 1997 – 2010 Indexed Container Moves at China Ports 1997 = 100

Source: Transport Trackers

Source: Transport Trackers

Authors: Charles de Trenck/Matthew Flynn/Henry Boyd / Publisher: SCMO

Reality of the New Import Ocean Supply Chain Import Security Filing

Published in 2009 in TranzAct and reproduced by courtesy of Albert Saphir

On January 26, 2010, the Importer Security Filing (ISF) Rule, commonly referred to as 10+2, will become effective. This will change to a mandatory rule with the U.S. Custom Border Protection (CBP) imposing fines.

The ISF ­ 10+2 Rule

On January 26, 2010 the Importer Security Filing (10+2) rule will be mandatory for all imported shipments into the United States. Given the magnitude of fines, potential liabilities and issues associated with imported inventory, it is important to understand the impact that this program can have on your company. We strongly recommend that your company invests in and prepares for this initiative.

Let's take a look at what you can expect. The CBP (U.S. Customs and Border Protection) will commence enforcing this new advanced electronic data requirement as of January 26, 2010 with severe penalties of US$5,000 (up to US$10,000 per ISF) for each for late filing, missing filing, or inaccurate filing. (Keep in mind that you are talking potentially about a filing for each container that you ship.) These penalties will be levied directly on the importer of record and mitigation, reduction of penalty amount is going to be very limited compared to traditional mitigation guidelines and practices of the past when dealing with CBP penalties.

While many shippers are focused on the findings, they are overlooking what may very well be the most punitive part of this program. It may take several months and possibly even a year or more for the CBP to levy their penalties. So if there is a mistake, or inaccurate filing, that could be easily corrected, this error could result in penalties for a tremendous number of containers.

Aside from the huge potential liability and its impact on your financial statements, here is something else that should really grab your attention: The ISF’s do not liquidate, so their risk remains “open” for up to six years as each ISF is secured with a bond which is considered a contract and thus contract law applies. In other words, future ISF penalties could be issued against an importer for ocean imports that happened six years ago (after 1/26/2010 of course), a huge record keeping dilemma! So just imagine a scenario under which CBP finds errors or consistent late filings for recent ISF’s. They could now go back six years and for sure find lots more. And you guessed right: Many more penalties will come your way. It may actually make an IRS audit look like a benevolent experience.

So what are your ISF financial exposures?

Some of you may now be asking just how significant the penalties and fines could be. Let's assume that your company has 1000 ocean shipments on an annual basis.

•    Penalties

If only 5% of them will have a single ISF exception, your annual penalty exposure could be as high as $500,000! And if this happens in later years and CBP deems that you have a material deficiency and elects to go back, the penalties become greater. And this ignores the amount of time your company is going to have to spend pulling down documentation to contest the CBP proceedings.

•    Bond amounts and bond fees

This is a wild card for now, but we are recommending that our customers evaluate their bond coverage. Do you believe your regular continuous bond of US$50,000 or US$100,000 (basically calculated to cover your estimated annual duty liability toward CBP) will suffice in the long run?

Let's go back and look at the import example. Hypothetically, your six-year ISF liability “on paper” is going to be at minimum, many millions of dollars! Do you think your US$100,000 will be sufficient for long? And if we take it one step further, we think many shippers have been lulled into a false sense of complacency. After all, how many penalties have you received for your 1,000 import shipments over the past year? Probably none or very few. What is particularly vexing now is the fact that your specific risk factor for ISF penalties is of course unknown. If we assume the low 5% from above, you are now going to have 50 penalties a year to sort out. Thus the sureties will most likely increase the continuous bond fee/ rate on top of potential higher bond amounts!

•    External ISF filing fees

For better or worse, a lot of companies have outsourced the ISF filing to their customs broker thus resulting in additional fees. The truth is that while these companies could be an ISF self-filer - and would in fact be better off being a self filer, they choose to incur the additional US$25,000 to US$50,000 expense in their annual expense budget.

•    Internal ISF data management cost

If you are a bit intimidated by the rules associated with importing containers, you may be interested to know that many companies do 99% of the work themselves to collect, assemble and validate the data required by their external filer. With the use of a global trade management tool (which accommodates ISF filings almost automatically), they could become self filer's. But we have seen several companies try to do it on their own with a homegrown system that can easily double, triple or even quadruple the above external ISF filing fee estimate and add a substantial burden to the additional internal cost to comply with ISF.

•    Other external ISF cost factors

As previously noted, companies tend to focus on the penalties. What they also need to consider are transit time delays that could disrupt their supply chains and result in additional inventory cost. These delays could be caused by issues such as both onshore and in-transit to absorb issues with delays, demurrage at foreign ports (if you detect an error and do not want to face an ISF penalty), or demurrage and CBP intensive examination costs for those shipments arriving without an ISF on record.

What can you do?

If you've read this far then you know that 2010 will be a year full of new challenges in managing the global supply chain. The good news is that 2010 will also provide unique opportunities for those bold enough to embrace change and think outside the traditional box. And for some companies the ISF issue is a way to implement new ideas, achieve better automation, and actually improve service quality while creating real value for their customers and employees alike.

There are many advantageous ways to reduce:

  •     Your potential financial exposure
  •     Your ISF expenses (an 80% reduction of the aforementioned cost is not impossible)
  •     Risk of disruptions in the supply chain

Overall your company can create a better import process and actually turn the ISF challenge into a competitive advantage.

If you're looking for some inspiration, consider what Crate & Barrel has achieved with their ISF initiative. Crate & Barrel completely redesigned their import ocean supply chain during 2009 due to the new ISF requirement which went into effect on 1/26/2009. While many importers just sat on the sidelines and chose to take a risk by relying on a “Band-Aid” for a quick fix solution, Crate&Barrel took a very different approach to the challenge presented.

They commenced on their visionary and strategic ISF compliance program in late 2008 and achieved great results - considerable cost increase avoidance plus much improved supply chain visibility during 2009 and going forward into 2010. As you look at the data you can understand, this was a challenging assignment: 7,500 annual FEUs (forty foot equivalent containers), over 30 countries of origin, over 600 active import vendors, 3 steamship lines and 12 forwarders/ NVOs. But their willingness to invest in order to improve their import supply chain process and achieve complete compliance with this new CBP mandate has put them far ahead of most other U.S. importers. They are ready for a successful 2010 and beyond.

Experience has proven that if you understand the issues and invest in people, technology and continued process improvement you can be successful. And this is true with the ISF requirement.

Conclusion

ISF self-filing is only best practice out there and must begin with the importer completely analyzing and re-designing their import supply chain around this new requirement to determine what the best choices are. This can include “unified entry filing” (combined ISF and customs entry in one shot) through your customs broker, ISF filing by your foreign freight forwarder/ NVOCC, or even ISF filing by your foreign supplier.

Need one more reason why you should be proactive in addressing the whole area of shipment security? There is another initiative/ challenging regulatory item that shippers will have to plan for in 2010: The TSA “Certified Cargo Screening” (CCSP) program. It requires that as of August 1, 2010, 100% of all air cargo going onto a passenger aircraft needs to be screened at a piece level. This will require major changes for everyone in the air freight supply chain, and it is a big jump from the current 50% screening level. Expect potential lengthy delays as airfreight is queuing for screening and additional cost as this is an unfunded mandate from Congress, and thus all cost must be borne by the user of air freight services.

ISF FAQ

What information do importers need to file?

Importers must submit eight pieces of data no later than 24 hours before landing:

1. Seller (name/ address)
2. Buyer (name/ address)
3. Importer of Record Number/ FTZ Applicant ID Number (IRS, EIN, SSN, or CBP assigned number)
4. Consignee Number(s) (same as above, plus name/address unless the consignee is also the Importer of Record)
5. Manufacturer (or supplier)
6. Ship to party (name/ address)
7. Country of origin
8. Commodity HTSUS number (to the 6-digit level)

Two additional pieces of data must be submitted no later than 24 hours prior to arrival:

9. Container stuffing location
10. Consolidator (name/ address)

What information do carriers need to file?

Carriers are responsible for providing two final elements:
1. Vessel stow plan (must be submitted no later than 48 hours after the ship’s departure)
2. Container Status Message (CSM) Data (must be submitted within 24 hours of creation or receipt)

What if I don’t have this information or I choose not to file?

If an importer doesn’t file or submits information that is inaccurate, incomplete, or late, CBP may charge US$5,000 per violation. CBP may also withhold the release or transfer of cargo, refuse to grant permits, mark orders as “Do Not Load,” conduct additional cargo inspections, and, in some cases, seize cargo.

Author: Albert Saphir / Publisher: SCMO

Big Steel, Price Swings of Yesteryear… and Dominance Role Reversals

Reproduced from a 19 April 2010 article by courtesy of "Transport Trackers"

Given the recent stories on steel and price hikes we took a quick look sample historical reactions to price hikes. In April 1962, John F. Kennedy panicked after US steel companies proposed to raise steel prices $6/ton, as the proposed rises threatened his economic program. He went on TV, after earlier planning a multi-pronged campaign against Big Steel, to denounce the steel companies price change decision (“in ruthless disregard…” Please refer to http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x‐sIYl5C4mY). ...

If one thinks about it, a ton of steel was $20 ‐ $40 in the 1920s while an ounce of gold was fixed at $20.67/oz before the Fed appeared to get a present from Roosevelt in 1933 through the re‐fixing of gold at $35/oz. Steel per ton could loosely be put at $600 ‐ 800/ton today against about $1,100/oz for gold. Just an observation: Steel is up by a factor of about 20x in a century; gold is up by a factor of about 40x... We are not experts in steel and commodities, simply interested bystanders wanting to know more about many of the products going on ships, and their drivers.

Margins for the US steel industry were estimated, in an article of the day citing AP Business News, 10 April 1963, at about 4% net profit margin in 1962, down 15% from 1963. In comparison, US steel in 2009 had a negative EBIT margin over 15%, though this had come after a five‐year streak of EBIT margins averaging just under 10% prior to 2009.

Kennedy’s 1962 frontal assault on Big Steel led US steel companies to drop prices even below levels they had tried to raise them from (the attack coming when margins were 4%). By 1963, a number of papers came out on economic effects in the steel industry, with none other than Townsend’s Greenspan (remember Greenspan’s consultancy firm?) preparing a paper for the Society National Bank of Cleveland, among other papers, showing that US GDP between 1955‐62 increased 20% in real terms but that the steel industry, one of the centerpieces of the US economy at the time, was slowing in real terms, given only a 5% expansion during the period.

The article citing Greenspan (an analyst at Wellington submitted to the Financial Analysts Journal for November 1963) went on to speak of the US loss of market share to foreign producers. … In other articles we saw talk of 2.5 – 3.5% wage increase complaints from steel bosses. But overall, we got the feeling from most discussions that a lot of people walked around assuming flat costs, especially raw materials sourcing. Another thing people/ organizations did, as seen in many articles of the time available for viewing today via Google, is repeat verbatim press blurbs, so quite often price rise announcements simply stated the quantum of rise with no reference to base price (ie, it’s difficult to get one’s bearing on price points).   … From reading articles from the 1920s on steel, on comparatively more turbulent times for steel prices than the late 50’s and early 60s, the price of steel had about doubled between pre‐ and post‐ WWI from about $20/ton to about $40/ton.

We had noted in recent weeks, some research reacting to iron ore price increases without appropriately adjusting for cost increases 1 . We still think more work needs to be done on this front, but some, among others, have flagged the impact of higher spot iron ore and quarterly contracting for some of the mills that historically relied more on annual contracting. Margin squeezes and demand patterns after price rises appear important questions/topics...

1 We could not believe one note we read from a large broker in late March ‘10, which raised steel price estimates for 2010 by LSD percentage points and put the average forecast for steel/ton for 2010 far below current price, with barely a mention of margin squeeze or indication of forward iron ore pricing views given the numbers laid out…. But we have seen other notes more recently doing a better job of forecasting margin squeezes. Still we would like to have seen a theme piece on steel looking at elasticities of demand in China and globally based on higher ore, coal, steel, etc..No doubt, someone is doing it. … Our long term view is that China needs to bring down production and demand which feeds into the construction of empty or low vacancy buildings, and stop stimulating for the sake of stimulating…China has taken baby steps in this regard, though in some sense even these steps have at times appeared more than that of the US Fed…But that’s just our view.

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So what’s changed in 50‐100 years of looking at price data and relationship?

Short answer: Not much, and everything. Today, repeating of press blurbs and sensationalism in headlines is perhaps still based on similar practices as in past. There are a lot more moving parts, to be sure. In the past, we could go years without a price change in an input. Later (in 60s, 70s??), some of that price stickiness was even down to command economy features, even in the US economy…Back then you’d get a US president dedicating speeches against price rises. Today we have infinite price changes of inputs and outputs, issues of over‐demand out of China, cheap capital from central banks, and…2The politics of steel perhaps haven’t changed as much as one would think, though. The politics were bad in the 1960s… and they are bad now.

What’s changed the most, in our view, is the order of things not just turning upside down (which Hegel or Marx would have understood/liked), but steel (and oil, etc) geopolitics are going in multiple directions at the same time.

In the heyday of the rise of the US as a superpower, it was about US dominance taking over from the British, etc. Everyone “knew their place...” 3The new good guys (US) were producing and dominating the market for key outputs. Sourcing contracts were in place and it was done more efficiently than the new bad guys (USSR) were doing it. Today, China (which was briefly aligned with the then bad guys) is producing more, if not most, efficiently, yet. And now it is sourcing at spot rather than on contract from developed and developing countries alike.

US Hot Rolled Midwest Avg $/ton, 1980 – Current (Monthly Series)

Source: Bloomberg

Source: Bloomberg

Notes

1 We could not believe one note we read from a large broker in late March ‘10, which raised steel price estimates for 2010 by LSD percentage points and put the average forecast for steel/ton for 2010 far below current price, with barely a mention of margin squeeze or indication of forward iron ore pricing views given the numbers laid out…. But we have seen other notes more recently doing a better job of forecasting margin squeezes. Still we would like to have seen a theme piece on steel looking at elasticities of demand in China and globally based on higher ore, coal, steel, etc..No doubt, someone is doing it. … Our long term view is that China needs to bring down production and demand which feeds into the construction of empty or low vacancy buildings, and stop stimulating for the sake of stimulating…China has taken baby steps in this regard, though in some sense even these steps have at times appeared more than that of the US Fed…But that’s just our view.

2Thisremindsus   of   a   versionof   “Stay”  mostnicelyupdatedby   JacksonBrownebackin   the‘70s…  (today…  “wegottruckerson   CB…”) from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtuvXrTz8DY (1978 performance linked here)

3 …Until we got thinks like the Leontief Paradox… This takes us back to the Leontief Paradox on Heckscher Olin theorem problems, which was based on Leontief in 1954 (quite early on …) finding that the US, the most capital‐abundant country in the world, exported labor‐intensive commodities and imported capital‐intensive commodities in contradiction to the Heckscher‐Ohlin, which held that “a capital‐abundant country will export the capital‐intensive good, while the labor‐abundant country will export the labor‐intensive good.”

Author: Charles de Trenck / Publisher: SCMO

So you want to be an Intra-Asia Trade player?

Reproduced from a 12 March 2010 article by courtesy of "Transport Trackers"

Container veteran Niels K Balling contributed this think piece on Intra-Asia containers. We leave his title in place as it reminds us of the song by the Byrds, and later sung by Patti Smith (So You Wanna Be a Rock and Roll Star). Mr Balling notes, in passing, that the intra-Asia market is so big and complex that trying to boil it down in this fashion perhaps does not do it justice, so he apologizes in advance...

The Southeast Asia/North Asia countries comprising the core Intra-Asia market have become the largest container trade in the world, by far (despite some over-counting a few years back in a now infamous looking at the market by a well-known report we refer to sometimes). We exclude the Asia/Australia and Asia/India and Middle East trades as they are independent trades served by independent assets.

Key issues:

Total REAL profit pool of the core Intra-Asia trade is destined to remain miniscule

Only niche operators will be able to cover the cost of dedicated capital deployed to this theatre

Roughly 1/3rd of the trade volume is handled by main line operators on trunk routes

Rest evenly split between dedicated major services, feeder services, niche operations and domestic protected trades

The Main Line Operators (MLOs) provide negative marginal pricing to offset equipment positioning needs they have anyhow, and to build container terminal volumes that generates lower total terminal handling cost. In other words sunk cost discounted to zero (or less), combined with marginal pricing for growth purposes to achieve lower variable cost. That's not entirely crazy as the volume gain often will generate more value through terminal handling discounts than the real Yield of Intra-Asia cargo. And the discount may apply to the TOTAL volume thus leveraging the discounted Intra-Asia business to great effect.

Any dedicated operator (as some of the traditional Intra-Asia shipping companies will tell you) can never recover the cost of normal operations against such network economics.

Next come feeder (about 15% of Intra-Asia volumes) and the quasi feeder operations. The latter comprises about 55% of dedicated Intra-Asia services. These are services deployed for combined Intra-Asia trade and MLO network purposes. The feeder and quasi feeder operations work on the same discounted cost basis.

The only reason for existence of 3rd party feeder operators is that they can do it cheaper than the main line operators despite the latter counting on their own sunk cost. How can the 3rd party operators survive? In most cases it comes down to lower asset and capital costs - for as long as it lasts.

In other words on a net, net basis a relatively large part of the major Intra-Asia trades are served based on dedicated shipping services to their operational scope without any hope of rate or cost differentiation against the main line operators' network economics. They cannot bring specific financial value to the table that can support a dedicated operation. And they die – and get reborn – regularly.

Overall Intra-Asia has a negative profit pool due to the sunk cost approach by main line operators. That's a great trade facilitator and may continue to support rapid volume expansion of Intra-Asia container volumes.

But where's the money for the shipping investors?

There's a lot of money available in this profit pool. If one knows where to look. There are several niche opportunities as well as classic arbitration windows available.

The niches are fairly obvious, especially within the Refrigerated foodstuff area. This is becoming an interesting niche because of slow steaming by main line operators. Certain products, like bananas, are highly transit-time sensitive and need fast, reliable transport. The arbitrage opportunities are however an even more interesting and growth opportunity generating.

The Intra-Asia trade to a large extent is an outgrowth of the coastal economic development within Asia. Part of the success of Asia is that logistics costs were always low. This is no more a given. Redistribution within Asia is becoming more costly, though sea represents the cheaper option and contributes to reducing costs. Just think of haulage cost in Japan to outlier areas. Or Taiwan, Korea cost for trucking to other consumer areas. And/ but... China is now joining the game.

The Intra-Asia trade regionally is essentially similar to domestic haulage in the US and Europe.

There are no major green issues yet except Japan, where basic economics already make it very compelling to distribute to say Southern Japan via China by ship rather than paying huge costs over road and ferry via Tokyo or Kobe. In other words, use shipping to avoid domestic land based transport.

Intra-Asia will continue to provide growing opportunities for transport arbitrage opportunities, for new entrants. And Intra-Asia transport costs will continue to remain low based on intelligent MLOs going beyond normal yield management to leverage their network for ever better marginal cost throughout their global operations.

For both types of operators Intra-Asia will continue to expand in value.

For new entrants the advice is that deep understanding of their market of choice will make the difference between survival and quick demise.

Author: Niels K Balling / Publisher: SCMO

 

 

How Inflation Hits Asia’s Traders

Reproduced from a 2008 article published in the <em>Far Eastern Economic Review</em> <em>(now deceased</em>) — Reproduced by courtesy of <em>Charles De Trenck</em> — At the time, Mr. De Trenck was head of Asia transport research at Citigroup and had been following shipping since the mid-1990s.

A piece I wrote for the <em>Far Eastern Economic Review</em> last year (“Shattering Shipping Myths,” June 2007) might have seemed overly pessimistic at the time. I sketched out a scenario where demand for manufactured goods from Asia and China fell off steeply as a result of a property bust in the United States, as food andenergy costs rose further. Events have unfolded faster than I expected, largely because shipping demand in Europe slowed quickly and there was a sharp decline in U.S. inbound volume. The one bright spot has been a healthy rebound in U.S. exports.

Shipping, as ever, is a window into global trade and the global economy. Looking deeper into the global container industry can today elicit a better understanding of shifting trade patterns, rising production costs and declining consumer demand. And in comprehending the current slowdown in Asian exports and in global trade in general, we should now be looking at the slackening pace of economic activity and its impact in terms of how far along we are on the downward slope, and more importantly, how might growth trajectories shift us further down or back up.

Right now, we should be close — a matter of months perhaps — to a bottom in terms of export deceleration from Asia to the U.S. As for the European side of the equation, we are perhaps another six to 12 months away from a bottoming of export growth rates. Yet there are likely to be some notable differences from previous downturns. In?ation — coming after a long period of low interest rates — combined with China and commodity booms and a shifting role for the dollarare all part of this potent cocktail.

Using the economic slowdowns of the 1970s and 1980s for comparison is not straightforward given that global supply chains for manufactured goods were still relatively embryonic back then. Even so there is much to learn from what happened to bulk and tankers after the 1970s boom. What we should try to track is the difference between trade growth by volume and value, focusing on the ?ows of manufactured goods. Today, containerized trade transports far higher amounts of high-tech goods, as well as steel parts and agricultural commodities than was the case 20 years ago. With container trade tracking, we can look at both container port performances and vessel transport growth in order to better triangulate patterns.

China’s container port volume growth is slowing more than nominal trade statistics indicate. Total port volumes grew 17% in May and 15% in April, this level representing a signi?cant slowdown from the 23% levels one year ago. Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Qingdao have all seen overall volumes signi?cantlybelow the current average. Trade export values in dollars grew 28% in May and 22% in April (versus averages of around 28% one year ago). The difference represents a decline of about four percentage points.

China container ports have seen volume growth rates shift down from percentages in the mid-20s range to percentages in the mid to high-teens (when we exclude Hong Kong), representing a decline of about seven percentage points. The change in differential is at least a few percent, with the issue of the yuan only indirectly related. When we adjust to include Hong Kong in the calculation,  which we must do at some stage given that Hong Kong still handles substantial chunks of China trade, up to 10 percentage points of growth are lost in the differential between value and volume.

Since 2007, trade volumes on container ships out of Asia have slowed to low single digit growth, but the value of trade relative to the volume of trade — the rise of prices in the system — has shifted up. The Asia export value data taken against container export volume growth, shows a distinct pattern: The value of goods’ exports is increasing faster than the volume of goods. The China export data, which of course represents the single largest component of Asia exports, shows the trend even more clearly.

The China trade and Asia container data for May give a clear warning that the value-volume differential is growing rapidly in 2008. This is starting to look a little like inflation with Chinese characteristics — which takes us back to the potent in?ation cocktail of low real rates and high commodities prices brewing in recent years.

That China volume growth would slow down somewhat was expected. And yet everyone has continued to think of China as the world’s workshop for cheap goods without realizing that volumes can lose out to higher prices. China’s input costs have shot up as have transport costs, of which one-third are fuel costs, while developed country demandin volume terms is shifting down more rapidly than can be seen using conventional terms such as store sales. Could it be that in?ation as glossed over with cpi-adjusted statistics is the wrong measure to use? Our tracking of the value-to-volume gap tells us instinctively this has been one of the built-in problems in tracking trade for years. It did not matter when volumes and values were similar. But it matters now.

The markets recently learned the U.S. consumer has shifted down demand, especially in volume terms. No doubt the U.S. consumer will stage rebounds in demand, especially if oil prices come back below some magic number such as $100. But what if the American consumer is forced to dispense with his or her disposable consumer society behavior for a couple more years because the pocketbook has shrunk and goods are structurally higher in price?

Inflation that has progressed from commodities to ?nished goods — higher steel prices to higher ship prices, to higher prices of Chinese goods — should work in reverse once demand slows. But not before bringing down average volume demand growth rates further. Until 2007, long-term growth of volumes from Asia to the U.S. was about 10%, with 2007 itself already coming at zero. The current run rate for 2008 is looking to be minus 2% if we stop decelerating in the ?rst half of 2008. To put that in perspective, long-term global containerized trade has runningaround 9% to 10% , with the U.S. driving the largest portion of that growth until 2006 and 2007, and Europe taking over in 2007.

Now the picture we are getting in 2008 is worse than expected in volume terms. Into the U.S., growth not only has slowed into ?at or negative year-on-year growth for a few months, but we are now down for the last 12 months on average. We have to go back to 1995 and 1996 to ?nd the same kind of volume slowdown. And Europe inbound container volume, which has seen long-term growth closer to 15% and about 19% in 2007, has also decelerated rapidly and is now running at the 10% level in 2008, and even that level is thanks to some continued pocketsof strength in the newer markets of Eastern Europe. The areas of weakness encompass most of old Europe.

To make matters worse, new ships are increasing the supply of shipping capacity. Demand in volume terms has decelerated about 10 percentage points on the key Asia-export trade lanes, while the more expensive recently ordered ships (regardless of operation speeds) will only be coming on line faster in the coming two to three years.

In?ation is still on the rise. Input, production and transport costs have all gone up. The question is when and how prices might fall as excess capacity forces shippers to compete for scarce customers. For the moment, we can’t assume cost pressures will ease soon. Thus we can’t assume demand volumes are finished declining — though we can speculate as to a potential deceleration in declines. As demand declines, there will be great opportunities to lower transport costs, and also to identify investment opportunities once lower growth gets priced in. But Asia needs to face the fact the run rate of demand is shifting down and that we don’t know just yet how this story will end.

Author: Charles De Trenck / Publisher: SCMO

 

On the Road to Disaster in India

Published on February 26, 2008 in World Politics Review and reproduced by courtesy of Parag Khanna

On the Uttar Pradesh-Bihar frontier, the chungi system is alive and well. One of the most unnecessary legacies of British colonialism, no less than five kilometers of trucks — those colorfully decorated and melodically horned belching beasts, overloaded with everything from steel beams to sacks of flour — sit idle, waiting to show their permits, sales tax chits, and other sheaves of documents to corrupt officers.

My mother and I are on a nostalgic road trip from Delhi to Calcutta, driving on both emperor Akbar’s famed Grand Trunk road and its newest incarnation, the much touted “Quadrangle” project of major highways linking India’s largest cities: Delhi, Calcutta, Mumbai, and Chennai. We’re visiting the cities of our birth — me in Kanpur, and my mother in Banares (Varanasi) — and taking an honest stock of India’s superlatives: economic growth, social freedom and religious diversity, yes, but also over-population, corruption, and pollution. India’s northern belt is ground zero for all of these.

That India arrived late in initiating economic reforms is an old story. Now we are told that India is unstoppably on the move. Tell that to the truckers now 40 km behind us. In certain stretches, the Quadrangle’s two lanes are smooth. But even a clear highway is precarious here. Rather than bypass villages, the road sometimes goes straight through them, picking up cattle, pedestrians, cyclists, and beggars along the way. We swerve constantly to avoid these and other impediments. There is so much uncoordinated construction that we drive on detours of detours. On the best stretch, 75 kph would be cruising Nevada-style. But on our left the cab of a tractor-trailer is face down in a ditch. A crowd has gathered and barefoot, dust-covered women are weeping.

Those stuck in the chungi line and those scraping forward on the Quadrangle expose the twin disasters of India’s current development paradigm. Rather than treating infrastructure — roads, ports, railways, airports — as the sacred pillar of broad economic growth, it remains haphazardly executed at best. Building a two-lane highway for a billion-person country could hardly be considered planning with foresight. Not only will this Quadrangle not live up to its promise physically, but India’s politics, the other failure, are also completely out of synch. The federal government recommends one policy, the states do another, and corrupt intermediaries siphon off everything they can. My mom said it best back at the U.P.-Bihar checkpoint: “Bihar might as well be another country without a military.”

India is smilingly synonymous with chaos. Unlike China, it cannot be said with a straight face that India has a plan. A fair sampling of articles on India today would reveal headlines about the growing number of Indian billionaires on the Forbes list, Indian firms snapping up Western steel and auto makers and competing for Arab oil, and the country’s blossoming IT and biotech sectors, but also the proliferating suicides of indentured farmers, the Maoist-Naxalite insurgencies in eastern states, and the bloody sectarian tensions playing out from Gujarat to West Bengal. Indian businessmen proudly boast that “India works when the government gets out of the way.” But who will protect their giant retail grocery stores when they are attacked by mobs of angry local farmers, as happened to the Ambani clan’s newly minted outlet in the state of Jharkand recently? It’s great that even the dhobi wallah can talk on a cell phone while pressing clothes on a wooden cart with a 5-kilogram iron, but that doesn’t change the fact that if he tries to pedal his bike to the next town, he is likely to be hit by a truck.

No doubt development is a messy process. But to assume that just because Western industrialization witnessed employment, growth, declining fertility rates, and improved education the same will happen here is as useful as praying for the afterlife. Many of the relatives we are visiting are part of the new so-called middle class in India, owning a car, a motorcycle or two, and satellite television. They have adequate education, and are proud of their material achievements. And they have kids coming out of their ears. The cities they live in — such as Kanpur and Banares — are polluted with filthy trash beyond my and my mom’s worst memories. In the current low season, from the holy sangam point at Allahabad where the Jamuna and Ganges rivers meet and we collected a bottle of holy water, to the fabled ghats of Banares where we floated on a raft and witnessed candle-lit evening prayers, the Ganges feels like a fetid swamp. India’s most famous living writer, Khushwant Singh, said it best: “As we multiply, so do our problems.”

Indian officials will smugly lecture you about how redistribution of wealth is their problem; the outside world should just focus on investing and profiting in India. It’s a pity they don’t heed the advice of so many prominent Indian economists — Nobel laureate Amartya Sen only the most noted among them — who have devoted their careers to various aspects of sustainable development, by which social and environmental factors have a tremendous role to play in maintaining economic success. For India’s agricultural masses and urban squatters, education, sanitation, and healthcare have no translation, let alone progressive policies. The famed director Shekhar Kapur is currently directing a film about the coming “water wars” between Mumbai’s elites and slum-dwellers.

India, like the majority of the planet’s countries that I call “second world,” is perpetually on a knife’s edge: rising in status while dwindling in resources, growing richer in some places and poorer (as if that is even possible) in others, trying to build one nation while globalization and money empower narrow political and corporate interests to place their agendas above all else. In India all of this is playing out in what will soon be the most populous country in the world, with neither rules nor historical precedent to guide it.

For all the good news about India, there is one fact its leaders cannot transcend no matter which deity they pray to: A country is an organism, not a Lego set. Zones of development and zones of depletion cannot be kept separated. It is a race between the two to engulf the other, and in India the outcome is far from certain.

Author: Parag Khanna / Publisher: SCMO

More China in early 90s… and the beauty and madness of working for a small company

Reproduced from a 1993 article by courtesy of "I am an analyst"

Working for a smaller company is a great way to get work experience. Combine that with a wild west experience like China’s budding stock market of the early 90s, and you get turbocharged learning experiences. Today, you might have had to go to Vietnam, Cambodia and parts of India to get equivalent experiences.

By 1993 I was an investment analyst at Kerry Securities doing China research. The trips that left their biggest impression on me were very similar to my experiences in late-80s.

The single strangest experience I had around 1993 had been to take a big bus full of Japanese fund managers from Kokusai Asset Management to visit factories just outside Shenzhen. It was springtime and the rains were simply incredible downpours. At the same time, outlying Shenzhen areas were just in the process of building many of its highways.

I still remember the look on the fund managers faces as they looked out the bus window at the impact of the rains. There was no talking, as all their jawbones dropped and their eyes popped out of their heads as they stared at what reminded me of a scene from the film Terminator.

We were driving on mud roads, and all we could see everywhere was mud. Mud on the half-built highways, mud on the roads to the sides of the highways, and mud up to and into the small side-shops by the roads. The entire outskirts of Shenzhen were one mud pool construction site.

A related trip around the same time was when I rented out a car in Shenzhen for the day to take a group of Swiss fund managers between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. The purpose was to visit a few factories and tour the economic situation of Guangdong north of Shenzhen up to the Dongguan area (the most concentrated industrial area in Guangdong).

We traveled over parts of the Hopewell Superhighway that were built, and then around the side roads. The investors were shocked at the quality of the work being done. Typically Shanghai infrastructure projects were known, even in the 90s, to be generally good quality. But what we saw in Guangdong in 1993 looked like it would fall apart by 1997. The cement work for the highway flyovers just looked terrible. I explained to the managers stories circulating at the time that Gordon Wu had blown his cover with locals when he bragged about the profits he was going to make (anything over 15% annual returns came to be a no-no, and Wu bragged returns far higher), and also a contracting system that forced separate contract work to be done every two or so kilometers.

The Hopewell construction contracts were negotiated with multiple local parties. And every contractor brought different, generally low quality, work to their part of the highway. When we tried travelling over parts of the road at higher speeds, the car’s suspension would swing up and down to reflect the road bumps the suspension was absorbing. During the same period more stories surfaced about PLA army trucks being one of the main modes of freight transport on highways, and how overloaded and damaging they were to the roads…. The army trucks by-passed tolls and destroyed the roads at the same time. What a joke that was.

Author: Charles De Trenck / Publisher: SCMO